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It goes without saying that no introduction of M. Tarde is neces-
sary to English and American readers who are versed in current
sociological discussions. To the general reader, therefore, and to
him alone, I venture, on the insistent request of the publishers, to
say that in this little book he will find the leading ideas of one of
the most authoritative and distinguished living writers in sociol-
ogy and social psychology. M. Tarde’s larger works are summa-
rized and his system shown to be a system in these pages—in a
way that he humorously describes in his preface. In fulfilling the
purpose of systematization, however, the book makes a contribu-
tion to the theory of science at the same time that it exhibits a way
of treating sociological data under certain general laws. Whether
or no these laws—“repetition, opposition, adaptation”—be es-
tablished in the form proposed by the author, at any rate they are
likely to be much discussed and to take rank as brilliant formula-
tions in the development of a branch of knowledge in which syn-
thesis and constructive hypothesis are sorely needed.
Readers of this little volume will certainly turn to M. Tarde’s
larger books, and it is interesting to know that a translation of his
remarkable work, Les Lois de l’Imitation, is under the favorable
consideration of one of the leading American publishing houses.
I may add that the fine quality of Professor Warren’s transla-




In this little volume, which contains the substance of some lec-
tures delivered at the Collége Libre des Sciences Sociales, in Oc-
tober, 1897, I aim to give, not a mere outline or résumé of my
three principal works on general Sociology,1 but rather the inter-
nal bond that unites them. Their real connection, which has possi-
bly escaped the reader’s notice, is here made evident through ar-
guments of a more general character, which enable us, I think, to
embrace within a single point of view these three parts, published
separately, of a common thought—these disjecta membra, as it
were, of a single body of ideas. I may possibly be told that it
would have been quite as well had I first presented as a systematic
whole that which I have actually cut up into three separate publi-
cations. But, aside from the fact that a work in several volumes is
apt (and with reason) to alarm the modern reader, why should we
wear ourselves out in the work of building up such great struc-
tures—such complete edifices? Since our successors will have
nothing more pressing to do than demolish these structures in
order to make some other use of the materials or take possession
of a detached wing, it is surely as well to spare them the task of
demolition, by delivering our thought in fragments only. At the
same time, for the sake of those few who take the same pleasure
in putting together what is offered them in fragments, that others
do in tearing down what is presented to them in completed form,
it is perhaps not altogether bootless to add to the scattered parts
of one’s work a sketch or outline, indicating the general plan which
the author would like to have carried out had he possessed the
requisite strength and boldness. This is the only excuse offered




1. Les Lois de l’Imitation (The Laws of Imitation), L’Opposition
universelle (Universal Opposition), and La Logique sociale (Social
Logic).Introduction
When we traverse the gallery of history, and observe its motley
succession of fantastic paintings—when we examine in a cursory
way the successive races of mankind, all different and constantly
changing, our first impression is apt to be that the phenomena of
social life are incapable of any general expression or scientific
law, and that the attempt to found a system of sociology is wholly
chimerical. But the first herdsmen who scanned the starry heav-
ens, and the first tillers of the soil who essayed to discover the
secrets of plant life, must have been impressed in much the same
way by the sparkling disorder of the firmament, with its manifold
meteors, as well as by the exuberant diversity of vegetable and
animal forms. The idea of explaining sky or forest by a small num-
ber of logically concatenated notions, under the name of astronomy
or biology, had it occurred to them, would have appeared in their
eyes the height of extravagance. And there is no less complex-
ity—no less real irregularity and apparent caprice—in the world
of meteors and in the interior of the virgin forest, than in the re-
cesses of human history.
How is it, then, that in spite of this changing diversity in the
domain of sky and forest, among physical objects and living be-
ings, we have seen the birth and gradual growth of the sciences of
physics and biology? There are three essential elements involved
in the development of these branches, and these must be carefully
distinguished before we can form a complete and exact notion of
what is meant by a certain noun and adjective that are very widely8/Gabriel Tarde
used, namely, science and scientific.
In the first place, then, men began to perceive some similari-
ties in the midst of these differences, some repetitions among these
variations. Such are the periodic return of the same conditions of
the heavens, the cycle of the seasons, the regularly repeated suc-
cession of ages among living creatures,—youth, maturity, and old
age,—and the traits common to individuals of the same species.
There is no science of the individual as such; all science is general;
that is, it considers the individual as repeated, or as capable of
indefinite repetition.
Science is the co-ordination of phenomena regarded from the
side of their repetitions. But this does not mean that differentia-
tion is not an essential mode of procedure for the scientific mind.
It is the duty of science to differentiate, as well as to assimilate;
but only to the extent that the object differentiated is a type in
nature yielding a certain number of copies, and capable of indefi-
nite reproduction. A specific type may be discovered and care-
fully defined; but, if it be found to belong to a single individual
only, and to be incapable of transmission to posterity, it fails to
interest the scientist, except as a curious monstrosity. Repetition
means the production of something that at the same time pre-
serves the original; it implies simple and elementary causation
without creation. The effect reproduces the cause point by point,
just as in the case of transmission of movement from one body to
another, or the transmission of life from a living being to its prog-
eny.
But in addition to the question of reproduction, the phenom-
ena involved in destruction are of interest to science. And hence,
in every sphere of fact to which she directs her attention, science
must endeavor to discover, in the second place, the oppositions
that exist there and are germane to her object. Thus, she must
consider the equilibrium of forces, the symmetry of forms, the
struggles of living organisms, and the strife among all creatures.
But this is not all, nor even the most important element. The
adaptations of phenomena, and their relations in creative produc-
tion, must above all be dealt with. The scientist labors continuallySocial Laws/9
to detect, disentangle, and explain these harmonies. With their
discovery, he succeeds in establishing a higher adaptation, namely,
the harmony of his system of notions and hypotheses with the
interrelations of facts.
Thus science consists in viewing any fact whatsoever under
three aspects, corresponding, respectively, to the repetitions, op-
positions, and adaptations which it contains, and which are ob-
scured by a mass of variations, dissymmetries, and disharmonies.
The relation of cause to effect, in fact, is not the only element
which properly constitutes scientific knowledge. If it were so,
pragmatic history, the mere concatenation of causes and effects,
which simply teaches that certain battles and certain insurrections
had such and such consequences, would be the most perfect ex-
ample of science. Yet history, as we know, becomes a science
only when the relations of causality which it reveals are shown to
exist between a general cause, capable of repetition or actually
repeating itself, and a general effect, also repeated or capable of
repetition.
Again, mathematics never reveals causality in operation. When
a cause is postulated under the name of function, it is always dis-
guised as an equation. Yet mathematics is certainly a science; in
fact, it is the prototype of all science. And why? Because nowhere
has a more complete elimination of the dissimilar and individual
side of phenomena been effected, and nowhere do they present a
more exact and definite repetition, and a more symmetrical oppo-
sition. The great fault of mathematics lies in its not perceiving, or
taking adequately into account, the adaptations of phenomena.
Hence arises that insufficiency of the science, so strongly felt by
philosophers, especially the geometricians among them, such as
Descartes, Comte, and Cournot.
Repetition, opposition, and adaptation, I repeat, are the three
keys which science employs to open up the arcana of the uni-
verse. She seeks, before all else, not the mere causes, but the laws
that govern the repetition, opposition, and adaptation of phenom-
ena. These are three different species of laws, which must cer-
tainly not be confounded; yet they are quite as closely connected10/Gabriel Tarde
as they are distinct. In biology, for example, the tendency of spe-
cies to multiply in geometric progression (a law of repetition)
forms the basis of the struggle for existence and natural selection
(a law of opposition); and the appearance of individual variations,
the production of various individual aptitudes and harmonies, and
the correlation of parts in growth (laws of adaptation) are neces-
sary to the proper functioning of both.1 But, of these three keys,
the first and third are far more important than the second. The
first is the great pass-key; while the third, of finer construction,
gives access to treasures deeply hidden and most precious. The
second, an intermediary, of lesser importance, reveals certain strifes
and collisions of temporary utility, which are destined to fade away
little by little, though never completely, even this partial disap-
pearance being effected only after numerous transformations and
attenuations.
These reflections were needed in order to show what sociol-
ogy must be, if it is to deserve the name of science, and along
what paths sociologists must guide its course, if they wish to see
it assume, unchallenged, its proper rank. Like every other sci-
ence, it will attain this only when it has gained, and is conscious of
possessing, its own domain of repetitions, its own domain of op-
positions, and its own domain of adaptations, each characteristic
of itself and belonging wholly to itself. Sociology can only make
progress when it succeeds in substituting true repetitions, opposi-
tions, and harmonies for false ones, as all the other sciences have
done before it. And in place of repetitions, oppositions, and adap-
tations that are true but vague, it must find others that become
ever more exact as it advances.
Let us place ourselves at each of these standpoints in turn,
first of all to ascertain whether or not the evolution of science in
general, and sociology in particular, has taken place in the manner
which I have already imperfectly defined, and which I shall be
able to define more fully as we proceed; in the second place, to
point out the laws of social development under each of these three
aspects.Social Laws/11
Notes:
1. It will be noted that Cuvier and the naturalists of his time, including
even his opponent Lamarck, sought out primarily the laws of adapta-
tion, while, on the other had, Darwin and his evolutionist disciples
preferred to consider the phenomena of life from the standpoint of
repetitions and oppositions (the Malthusian law and the law of the
struggle for existence), though they certainly took into account or-
ganic adaptation also, which is the most important fact of all.Chapter I
The Repetition of Phenomena
Imagine ourselves in the presence of some great object, such as
the starry sky, the sea, a forest, a crowd, or a city. From every part
of such an object emanate impressions which strike the senses of
the savage as well as those of the scientist; but to the latter these
manifold and incoherent sensations suggest certain logically cor-
related notions, which together make up a bundle of explanatory
principles. How has this gradual elaboration of mere sensations
into notions and laws come about? By what process has our knowl-
edge of such phenomena become more and more scientific? The
change, I contend, has come about, in the first place, because we
have been constantly discovering a greater number of resemblances
among these phenomena, and because, in place of the merely su-
perficial, apparent, and deceptive resemblances among them, we
have come to discern certain other resemblances, at once deeper
and more real. In fact, we have passed from complex and con-
fused resemblances and repetitions of the whole to resemblances
and repetitions of the parts. These latter are more difficult to dis-
cover, but, once found, they prove to be more exact and elemen-
tary; they are at once infinitely numerous and infinitely small. It is
only after these elementary resemblances are perceived that the
higher, broader, more complex, and vaguer resemblances can be
explained and assigned their proper value. Such an advance oc-
curs whenever a number of fundamental differences that have pre-Social Laws/13
viously been considered sui generis are resolved into combina-
tions of resemblances. By this we do not mean to say that science,
as it advances, tends to eliminate the fundamental differences, or
to diminish in number the unrepeated aspects of phenomena. For,
while the grosser and more obvious distinctions of the mass dis-
solve under the searching glance of the scientific observer, their
place is taken by others which are at once more subtle and more
profound, and which multiply indefinitely, thus keeping pace with
the uniformities among the elements.
To apply this principle to the realm of stars. The science of
astronomy dates its origin from the moment when idle or curious
herdsmen noticed the periodicity of the apparent revolutions of
the heavens, the rising and setting of the stars, the circular courses
of the sun and moon, and the regular succession and recurrence
of their positions in the sky. But in those early times certain stars
appeared to be exceptions to the general order of this one mag-
nificent revolution, namely, the wandering stars, or planets; each
of these was supposed to follow a capricious course, which var-
ied at every moment from its own previous course and that of the
rest; later on it was observed that there was some regularity even
in these anomalies. Moreover, all stars—fixed and wandering, suns
and planets, including even the shooting stars—were held to be
essentially alike; the only striking difference admitted was between
the sun and moon, on the one hand, and all the others, on the
other; the two former being considered the only really distinctive
bodies in the firmament.
Now astronomy made its first step in advance when for this
one immense, apparent rotation of the entire heavens there was
substituted the conception of a host of lesser real rotations, which
differed greatly from one another, and were in no wise synchro-
nous, but each of which repeated itself indefinitely. The second
step occurred when the peculiar distinctiveness of the sun van-
ished, to be replaced by a more subtle differentiation of each sepa-
rate star, as the luminary of an invisible system, and centre of a
planetary world analogous to the whirling concourse of our own
planets. A still greater step in advance was made when the differ-14/Gabriel Tarde
ences of apparent sidereal rotation which, though general and
without exception, admitted irregularities in velocity, radius, ec-
centricity of orbit, etc., vanished before the Newtonian law of
attraction—the latter representing all these periodicities of move-
ment, from the most minute up to the greatest, and from the swiftest
to the most slow, as due to endless and continual repetitions of
one and the same fact, namely, attraction directly proportional to
the mass and inversely to the square of the distance. And it were
far better could we explain this fact in turn by the bold hypothesis,
constantly rejected, yet ever besetting us anew, which attributes
gravitation to the impacts of ether atoms, resulting from atomic
vibrations of inconceivable minuteness and multiplicity.
Am I not correct, then, in saying that the science of astronomy
has ever been concerned with resemblances and repetitions; that
it started out with a single resemblance and repetition, immense
and obvious in character, or with a small number at most, to ar-
rive ultimately at an infinite number of infinitesimal resemblances
and repetitions, real and elementary in character, which, when
they appeared, furnished an explanation of the former?
Now does this necessarily imply, by the way, that the sky has
lost any of its picturesqueness with the advances of astronomy?
By no means. For, in the first place, the increased precision of
apparatus and exactness of observations have enabled us to dis-
cern among the repetitions of stellar movements many differences,
hitherto unperceived, which have led to many new discoveries
notably that of Leverrier. And in the second place, our celestial
horizon has been constantly extended, and as its vastness has in-
creased, the differences existing among various stars and groups
of stars in respect to size, velocity, and physical characteristics
have become much more marked. The varieties of form among
the nebulae have multiplied, and when, at length, the spectro-
scope enabled us to analyze in so extraordinary a manner the chemi-
cal composition of the heavenly bodies, such differences were
found among them that men were led to believe in the existence
of radical differences between their respective inhabitants. Finally,
the geography of the nearest planets has been revealed more clearly,Social Laws/15
and, judging the rest from these (after studying the canals of Mars,
for instance), we may conclude that each of the countless planets
which circle above and beneath us possesses its own special char-
acteristics, its own world-chart, and its own local features, and
that these individual peculiarities give, there as here, a distinctive
charm to each particular region, and no doubt engrave the love of
country on the hearts of its inhabitants, whoever they may be.
Nor is this, in my opinion, all, though I shall only whisper it,
lest I incur the serious charge of becoming a metaphysician. I
believe that none of the above-mentioned differences, including
even the mere variety of arrangement and random distribution of
matter throughout space, can be explained on the theory of ex-
actly similar atomic elements—an hypothesis so dear to chemists,
who are in this respect the real metaphysicians; I do not see that
Spencer’s so-called law of the instability of the homogeneous ex-
plains anything. And hence, I believe that the only means of ex-
plaining this exuberant growth of individual differences upon the
surface of phenomena is by assuming that they spring from a motley
array of elements, each possessing its own individual characteris-
tics. Thus in the same way that the mass resemblances have been
resolved into resemblances of detail, so the gross and obvious
mass differences have been transformed into infinitely minute dif-
ferences of detail. And, just as resemblances among the details
alone furnish an adequate explanation of whatever resemblances
appear in the whole, so the elementary and invisible distinctions,
which I believe exist, alone furnish an adequate explanation of
those greater and more apparent differences that lend picturesque-
ness to the visible universe.
So much for the physical world. In the world of life the same
is true. Imagine ourselves placed, like primitive man, in the midst
of a forest. All the fauna and flora of a certain zone are there, and
we now know that the phenomena revealed by these divers plants
and animals, however dissimilar they may seem, resolve them-
selves ultimately into a multitude of infinitesimal facts which are
summed up in the laws of biology—whether it be animal or veg-
etable biology matters little, since the two are at present classed16/Gabriel Tarde
together. But at the outset men drew broad distinctions between
many things that we now place in the same category, while they
associated together many that we now differentiate. The resem-
blances and repetitions which were then perceived, and on which
the infant science of the organism was nourished, were superficial
and deceptive. Men classed together plants that had no kinship,
because their leaves and general form revealed some rough simi-
larity; while they drew sharp distinctions between plants of the
same family which were of different shape and outline. The sci-
ence of botany made an advance when it learned the relative value
of different characteristics, and discovered that the most impor-
tant of these (that is, the most repeated and significant, because
accompanied by a host of other resemblances) are not those which
are most obvious, but rather those which are most subtle and
minute, especially those pertaining to the generative organs, such
as the fact of having one cotyledon, two, or none at all.
And biology, the synthesis of zoology and botany, was born
when the cell theory demonstrated that in both animals and plants
the constantly repeated element is the cell—in the first place, the
germ cell and then the others that proceed from it—when it showed
that the fundamental phenomenon of life is an indefinite repetition
by each cell of the functions of nutrition and activity, growth and
fertilization, whose mould or cast each cell inherits and transmits
in turn to its own posterity. This conformity to precedent may be
called either habit or heredity. For simplicity’s sake, let us call it
all heredity, since habit is merely a sort of internal heredity, just as
heredity is only externalized habit. Heredity, then, is the form of
repetition appropriate to life, just as undulation, or periodic move-
ment, is its physical, and imitation (as we shall find) its social
form.
Thus we see that the progress of the science of living things
has resulted in gradually removing all barriers raised on the side
of their resemblances and repetitions, and substituting for these
few, gross, and obvious resemblances, countless others, far more
exact, though infinitely minute, which alone serve to explain the
former. But at the same time hosts of new distinctions appear, andSocial Laws/17
not only does the distinctive individuality of each organism be-
come more salient, but we are forced also to admit certain differ-
entiations of the cells themselves, and primarily of the germ cells;
for while nothing is more similar in appearance than two germs,
there is in reality scarcely any thing more different than their con-
tents. After experiencing the insufficiency of the explanations pro-
posed by Darwin and Lamarck to account for the origin of spe-
cies,—whose kinship, descent, and evolution, however, is beyond
dispute,—we must admit that the real cause of species lies hidden
within the cells, the invention, as it were, of some primitive germ
possessing an exceptionally fruitful individuality.
Well, then if we proceed to examine a city, a crowd, or an
army, in place of the sky or forest, I maintain that the above re-
flections can be applied to the growth of social science as well as
to astronomy and biology. Here, too, men generalizations, have
passed from hasty founded on splendid analogies that were at
once artificial and illusory, to generalizations supported by a mass
of minute facts, whose resemblance to one another was compara-
tively clear and exact. Sociology has long been in process of con-
struction. The first incoherent attempts were made when, amid
the distracting chaos of social data, men discerned, or believed
that they discerned, something periodic and regular. An early grop-
ing after sociology appeared in the ancient conception of a great
cyclic year, at the completion of which everything, in both the
social and natural worlds, should recur in the same order. In place
of this erroneously conceived single repetition of the whole, which
was welcomed by the fanciful genius of Plato, Aristotle devel-
oped in his Politics certain repetitions of detail (which, though
often true, were vague and difficult to grasp) concerning what is
most superficial, or certainly most unimportant, in the social life,
namely, the order of succession of the several forms of govern-
ment. Arrested at this point, the evolution of sociology began
again ab ovo in modern times. The ricorsi of Vico are the cycles
of antiquity, taken up and traced out anew, with somewhat less of
the fantastic element. This hypothesis and that of Montesquieu,
on the supposed similarity of civilizations developed in the same18/Gabriel Tarde
climate, are good examples of the superficial and illusory repeti-
tions and resemblances on which the science of sociology had to
feed before it was fitted to receive more substantial nourishment.
Chateaubriand, in his Essai sur les révolutions, drew a lengthy
parallel between the English revolution and the French revolu-
tion, and took pleasure in dwelling on even the most superficial
resemblances. Others founded elaborate theories on absurd analo-
gies drawn between the Punic and English character, or between
the Roman and British empires. This attempt to confine social
facts within lines of development which would compel them to
repeat themselves en masse with merely insignificant variations,
has hitherto been the chief pitfall of sociology, and that, whether
under the more rigid form conceived by Hegel, consisting of suc-
cessions of triads, or under the more exact and scientific form
that it has since received at the hands of the modern evolutionists.
The latter, in discussing the transformations of laws (particularly
the laws of family and of property) and the transformations of
language, religion, industry, and art, have ventured to formulate
general laws that would confine the progress of society, under
these different aspects, to a constant passing and repassing along
successive portions of the same arbitrary path. It remained to be
discovered later that these supposed rules are honeycombed with
exceptions, and that evolution, whether linguistic, legal, religious,
political, economic, artistic, or moral, is not a single road, but a
network of routes with many intersecting cross-ways.
Fortunately, screened and sheltered from view by these ambi-
tious generalizations, certain less venturesome workers strove,
with greater success, to formulate other more substantial laws
concerning the details. Among these should be mentioned the lin-
guists, the mythologists, and above all the economists. These spe-
cialists in sociological fields discovered various interesting rela-
tions among successive and simultaneous facts, which recurred
constantly within the limits of the narrow domain they were ex-
amining. In Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, Bopp’s Compara-
tive Grammar of the Indo-European Languages, and Dietz’s work,
to cite but three instances, we find a mass of observations of thisSocial Laws/19
sort, in which are pointed out the resemblances running through
countless human actions—resemblances in the pronunciation of
certain consonants and vowels, in buying and selling, in the pro-
duction and consumption of certain articles, etc. It is true that
these resemblances, when linguists endeavored to formulate them
further, gave rise to very imperfect laws, conforming to a major-
ity of cases only. But this is because the authors were in too great
haste to formulate them, and did not wait to remove from its husk
of partial truths the real kernel of absolute truth; to wit, the funda-
mental social fact which sociology is blindly pursuing, and which
it must attain before it can really develop into a science.
In some quarters the feeling has existed that we must look to
psychology for any general explanation of the laws and pseudo-
laws of economics, language, mythology, etc. No man held to this
view with greater force and clearness than John Stuart Mill. At
the end of his Logic he represents sociology as a species of ap-
plied psychology. Unfortunately he did not analyze the concept
carefully enough; and the psychology to which he looked for the
key to social phenomena was merely individual psychology—the
branch which studies the interrelations of impressions and imag-
ery in a single mind, believing that everything within this domain
can be explained according to the laws of association of these
elements. Thus conceived, sociology became a sort of enlarged
and externalized English associationism, and was in a fair way to
lose its originality. But it is not alone, nor chiefly to this intra-
cerebral psychology that we must look for the fundamental fact
of sociology, whose groupings and manifold combinations make
up our so-called simple phenomena, and form the data of the par-
ticular social sciences; it is rather in an inter-cerebral psychology,
which studies the rise of conscious relations between two or more
individuals, that we must seek it. The relation of one mind with
another is, in fact, a distinctive event in the life of each; it is abso-
lutely different from all their relations with the rest of the uni-
verse, giving rise to certain most unexpected states of mind, that
cannot be explained at all according to the laws of physiological
psychology.1 This relation between a subject and an object which20/Gabriel Tarde
is itself a subject—and not a perception in no way resembling the
thing perceived—will not allow the idealistic sceptic to call in
question the reality of the latter; on the contrary, it means that we
experience the sensation of a sentient thing, the volition of a
conating thing, and the belief in a believing thing,—the percep-
tion, in short, of a personality in which the perceiving personality
is reflected, and which the latter cannot deny without denying
itself. This consciousness of a consciousness is the inconcussum
quid which Descartes sought, and which the individual Self could
not give him. Moreover, this unique relation is not a physical im-
pulse given or received, nor is it the transmission of motor energy
from the subject to an inanimate object or vice versa, according
as we are dealing with an active or passive state; it is rather the
transmission of something internal and mental, which passes from
one to other of the two subjects, and that, curiously enough, with-
out being lost or in the slightest degree diminished in the first. But
what manner of thing is it, that can thus be transmitted from one
mind to another when they enter into psychological relation? Is it
their sensations or affective states? Evidently not; for these are
essentially incommunicable. The only material that two subjects
can communicate to each other and consciously share, with the
result that they feel themselves more closely united and more simi-
lar thereby, are their notions and volitions, their conclusions and
aims. These are forms which may still remain the same, in spite of
changes in content; they are products of that mental elaboration
which reacts almost equally well to any sensory data. Neither does
such a form alter perceptibly when it passes from a mind of the
visual type to one of the auditory or motor type. Thus the geo-
metrical ideas of one blind from birth are precisely the same as
those of geometricians endowed with the sense of sight. And simi-
larly, a plan of campaign proposed by one general whose tem-
perament is choleric and melancholy to others of mercurial and
sanguine or passive and phlegmatic dispositions may still remain
the same, if only the plan be concerned with the same series of
operations, and be desired by all with equal force, in spite of the
special and distinctive kinds of feeling that move each one sepa-Social Laws/21
rately to desire it. The strength of subjective tendency, or mental
eagerness, which I call desire, like the strength of intellectual grasp,
or mental adhesion and constraint, which I call belief, forms one
homogeneous and continuous stream. Though variously tinged
with the different shades of affectivity pertaining to each separate
mind, it nevertheless flows identically in each, now spreading and
dividing, now uniting and contracting, and passing freely from
one person to another, and from one perception to another in
each person, without change.
To say that every real science possesses its own peculiar do-
main of elementary, countless, and infinitely small repetitions, is
equivalent to saying that every real science is based on its own
special qualities. Quantity, indeed, implies the possibility of one
or more infinite series of infinitely small resemblances and repeti-
tions. For this reason I have thought it well to insist, elsewhere,
on the quantitative character of the two mental energies which,
like two diverging rivers, water the two opposite slopes of the
Self—its intellectual and its voluntary activity. If we deny their
quantitative character, we declare sociology to be impossible. But
we cannot deny it without ignoring the evidence; and a proof that
the quantities in question are really social factors is seen in the
fact that their quantitative character becomes more evident, and
is grasped by the mind with greater clearness, the larger the quan-
tities in which we see them, as when they manifest themselves in
the shape of currents of popular belief or passion, or in traditional
convictions and obstinacies of custom, embracing large groups of
men. The more a group increases in size, the more the rise or fall
of opinion, whether affirmative or negative, with respect to a given
object, becomes capable of measurement. Such fluctuations of
national belief or volition, indicated, for example, by the rise or
fall of shares on the exchanges, then become comparable to the
changes of temperature or atmospheric pressure, or to the vary-
ing force of a water-fall. It is for this reason that a science of
statistics is more easily developed as states grow larger. The par-
ticular aim of statistics being to discover and separate real quanti-
ties from the confused general mass of social facts, the success of22/Gabriel Tarde
the science is greater the more it strives to reach beyond the par-
ticular human acts which it collects, and to measure the total mass
of beliefs and desires. The statistics of stock-exchange values ex-
press the variations of public confidence regarding the success of
certain enterprises, such as the solvency of a certain borrowing
state, and the changes in public desires and interests, to which
these loans or enterprises appeal. Industrial and agricultural sta-
tistics indicate the importance of the general needs which demand
the production of certain articles, or the probable suitability of the
means set in operation to meet the demand. Judicial statistics,
with their dry enumerations of trials or offences, are of interest to
consult only because, between their lines, we read the yearly in-
crease or decrease in the amount of public desires engaged in
proscribed or criminal channels, such as the tendency to divorce
or theft; here, too, we see the degree in which public hopes are
affected by certain kinds of trial or crime. The statistics of popu-
lation constitute, in most respects, merely a biological study, hav-
ing to do with the numerical growth of the race quite as much as
with the duration and progress of social institutions. But they have
a sociological import, in that they indicate the increase or de-
crease of the desire for paternity, maternity, and matrimony, as
well as of the prevailing belief that happiness is to be found in
marriage and the formation of fertile unions.
Under what conditions, then, is it legitimate to add together
these forces of belief and desire that lie stored up in different indi-
viduals? Evidently, on condition that they possess the same ob-
ject;—that they have regard to the same idea to be asserted, or
the same action to be executed. And what brought about this con-
vergence, which renders the individual energies capable of com-
bining to form a social unit? Can it have occurred spontaneously,
by a chance encounter, or by some sort of pre-established har-
mony? Decidedly not, except in a few instances; and even these
apparent exceptions, were there time to follow them out, would
be found to confirm the rule. This minute inter-agreement of minds
and wills, which forms the basis of the social life, even in troublous
times,—this presence of so many common ideas, ends, and means,Social Laws/23
in the minds and wills of all members of the same society at any
given moment,—is not due, I maintain, to organic heredity, which
insures the birth of men quite similar to one another, nor to mere
identity of geographical environment, which offers very similar
resources to talents that are nearly equal; it is rather the effect of
that suggestion-imitation process which, starting from one primi-
tive creature possessed of a single idea or act, passed this copy on
to one of its neighbors, then to another, and so on. Organic needs
and spiritual tendencies exist in us only as potentialities which are
realizable under the most diverse forms, in spite of their primitive
similarity; and, among all these possible realizations, the indica-
tions furnished by some first initiator who is imitated determine
which one is actually chosen.
Let us return, then, to the fundamental social couple, to which
I alluded just now; not the couple consisting of a man and woman
in love, for this couple, in so far as it is sexual, is a purely vital
phenomenon; but rather a couple composed of two persons, of
either sex, one of whom exerts a mental influence upon the other.
I maintain that the relation between these two persons is the one
essential element in the social life, and that it always consists, at
bottom, in an imitation of one by the other. But this fact must be
correctly interpreted, lest it fall before the onslaught of foolish
and superficial objections. No one will deny that whatever we
say, do, or think, once we are launched in the social life, we are
forever imitating some one else, unless, indeed, we are ourselves
making an inn ovation—an event that rarely happens; it is easy,
moreover, to show that our innovations are, for the most part,
combinations of previous examples, and that they remain outside
of the social life so long as they are not imitated. There is not a
word that you say, which is not the reproduction, now uncon-
scious, but formerly conscious and voluntary, of verbal articula-
tions reaching back to the most distant past, with some special
accent due to your immediate surroundings. There is not a reli-
gious rite that you fulfil, such as praying, kissing the icon, or mak-
ing the sign of the cross, which does not reproduce certain tradi-
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your ancestors. There is not a military or civil requirement that
you obey, nor an act that you perform in your business, which has
not been taught you, and which you have not copied from some
living model. There is not a stroke of the brush that you make, if
you are a painter, nor a verse that you write, if you are a poet,
which does not conform to the customs or the prosody of your
school, and even your very originality itself is made up of accu-
mulated common-places, and aspires to become common-place
in its turn.
Thus, the unvarying characteristic of every social fact what-
soever is that it is imitative. And this characteristic belongs exclu-
sively to social facts. On this point, however, a specious objection
has been urged against me by Professor Giddings, who, neverthe-
less, with remarkable ability, frequently adopts my own sociologi-
cal standpoint. One society, he declares, copies another; even en-
emies will imitate one another; we borrow each other’s arma-
ments, ruses of war and secrets of trade. Hence, the domain of
imitativeness goes beyond that of sociality, and cannot be a spe-
cial characteristic of the latter.2 But I am astonished at such an
objection on the part of an author who regards the struggle be-
tween societies as a potent agency looking toward their ultimate
socialization and merger into a broader society built up by their
very battles. For is it not obvious that, to the extent that rival or
hostile peoples assimilate their institutions, they themselves tend
to coalesce? And hence, while it is perfectly true that each new
act of imitation between individuals already associated tends to
preserve and strengthen the social bond, it is no less certain that
such an act between individuals not yet associated prepares them
for an association that may take place in the future, weaving by
invisible threads something that will in time become a palpable
bond. As regards some other objections that have been raised
against me, I need not stop to consider them, since they arise
from a very imperfect understanding of my ideas. They will disap-
pear of their own accord if one will but place himself squarely at
my standpoint. I refer the reader to my works for the elucidation
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But it is not enough merely to recognize the imitative charac-
ter of every social phenomenon. I go further, and maintain that
this imitative relation was not, in the beginning, as it often is later,
a connection binding one individual to a confused mass of men,
but merely a relation between two individuals, one of whom, the
child, is in process of being introduced into the social life, while
the other, an adult, long since socialized, serves as the child’s per-
sonal model. As we advance in life, it is true, we are often gov-
erned by collective and impersonal models, which are usually not
consciously chosen. But before we speak, think, or act as “they”
speak, think, or act in our world, we begin by speaking, thinking,
and acting as “he” or “she” does. And this he or she is always one
of our own near acquaintances. Beneath the indefinite they, how-
ever carefully we search, we never find anything but a certain
number of he’s and she’s which, as they have increased in number,
have become mingled together and confused. Simple though this
distinction be, it is nevertheless overlooked by those who deny
that individual initiative plays the leading role in any social institu-
tion or undertaking. These writers imagine they are stating a
weighty truth when they assert, for instance, that languages and
religions are collective productions; that crowds, without a leader,
constructed Greek, Sanscrit, and Hebrew, as well as Buddhism
and Christianity, and that the formations and transformations of
societies are always to be explained by the coercive action of the
group upon its individual members (so that the latter, great and
small alike, are always moulded and made subordinate to the
former), rather than by the suggestive and contagious influence
of certain select individuals upon the group as a whole. In reality,
such explanations are quite illusory, and their authors fail to per-
ceive that, in thus postulating a collective force, which implies the
conformity of millions of men acting together under certain rela-
tions, they overlook the greatest difficulty, namely, the problem
of explaining how such a general assimilation could ever have
taken place. But this question is solved, if we extend the analysis,
as I have done, to the intercerebral relation of two minds, the one
reflecting the other. Only thus can we explain the partial agree-26/Gabriel Tarde
ments, the beating of hearts in unison, and the communions of
soul, which, once brought about, and afterward perpetuated by
tradition and the imitation of our ancestors, exert on the indi-
vidual a pressure that is often tyrannical, but oftener still most
salutary.3 It is this relation, then, that the sociologist must adopt
as his own peculiar data, just as the astronomer adopts the rela-
tion between two masses, the attracting and the attracted; it is
here that he must seek the key to the social mystery; it is from this
that he must endeavor to derive the few simple but universal laws,
which may be distinguished amid the seeming chaos of history
and human life.
What I wish to call attention to at present is that sociology,
thus understood, differs from the older conceptions that passed
under the same name in the same way that our modern astronomy
differs from that of the Greeks, or that biology, since the intro-
duction of the cell theory, differs from the older natural history.4
In other words, it rests on a foundation composed of real and
elementary resemblances and repetitions which are infinitely nu-
merous and extremely exact; these have replaced a very small
number of erroneous, or at least vague and deceptive analogies as
primary material for scientific elaboration. And I may add, also,
that, while social similarity has gained in extent and depth by this
substitution, social differentiation has gained no less by the change.
We must, from now on, no doubt, abandon such artificial differ-
ences as the “philosophy of history” established between succes-
sive peoples, each of which, like the chief actors of an immense
drama, had his own predetermined role to play. Hence, it is no
longer allowable to interpret those much abused expressions: “the
genius of a people or race,” “the genius of a language,” or “the
genius of a religion,” in the way that some of our predecessors,
including even Renan and Taine, understood them. These embodi-
ments of collective character, appearing under the guise of meta-
physical entities or idols, were endowed with a fictitious personal
identity, which was, however, rather indefinite. Certain predispo-
sitions, supposed to be invincible, for some particular grammati-
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freely attributed to them. On the other hand, they were supposed
to have an insuperable repugnance to borrowing conceptions or
institutions from certain of their rivals. The Semitic genius, for
instance, was held to be absolutely irreconcilable with polythe-
ism, parliamentary government, and the analytic scheme of mod-
ern languages; the Greek genius with monotheism; the Chinese
and Japanese genius with all our European institutions and con-
ceptions generally. If the facts protested against such an ontologi-
cal theory, they were tortured to compel them to acknowledge its
truth. It was useless to call the attention of these theorists to the
radical transformations which a proselyting religion, a language,
or an institution such as the jury system, undergoes, when it spreads
far beyond the boundaries of its original race or people, in spite of
invincible obstacles that the “genius” of other nations or races
may seem to rear against it. They replied by revising the notion
and distinguishing, at least, between noble and inventive races,
which were alone endowed with the privilege of discovering and
spreading discoveries, and races born to be in subjection, which
had no understanding of language, religion, or ideas, and bor-
rowed this material, or appeared to borrow it, from the former.
Moreover, they denied that such a proselyting conquest of one
civilization or race genius over another could pass certain bounds,
as, for example, in the Europeanization of China and Japan. As
regards the last, the contrary has since proved itself true, and it
will soon prove true of the Middle Kingdom also.
Sooner or later, one must open his eyes to the evidence, and
recognize that the genius of a people or race, instead of being a
factor superior to and dominating the characters of the individu-
als (who have been considered its offshoots and ephemeral mani-
festations) is simply a convenient label, or impersonal synthesis,
of these individual characteristics; the latter alone are real, effec-
tive, and ever in activity; they are in a state of continual fermenta-
tion in the bosom of every society, thanks to the examples bor-
rowed and exchanged with neighboring societies to their great
mutual profit. The impersonal, collective character is thus the prod-
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characters; it is their composite photograph, and must not be taken
for their mask. We shall certainly lose nothing of that social pic-
turesqueness which makes the historian an artist, when, having
cleared up, rather than cleared away, this phantasmagoria of great
historic actors called Egypt, Rome, Athens, etc., we perceive be-
hind it a swarm of individual innovators, each sui generis, stamped
with his own distinctive mark, and recognizable among a thou-
sand. Hence I conclude, once more, that in adopting this socio-
logical standpoint we shall have done precisely what all the other
sciences have done as they progressed, namely, replaced the small
number of erroneous or uncertain resemblances and differences
by countless real and exact ones; this is a great gain for both the
artist and the scientist; but it is a still greater gain for the philoso-
pher, who, if he is to retain a distinctive function, must undertake
a synthesis of the two.
A few remarks more. So long as none of the elementary as-
tronomical facts, such as the Newtonian Law, or at least that of
elliptical orbits, had been discovered, there were many heteroge-
neous bits of astronomical knowledge,—a science of the moon,
selenology, and a science of the sun, heliology, – but there was no
astronomy. So long as there had been no discovery of the elemen-
tary facts of chemistry (affinity and combination in definite pro-
portions), there were many bits of chemical knowledge, and the
special chemistries of iron, tin, copper, etc., but no science of
chemistry. So long as men had not discovered the essential fact of
physics, the undulatory transmission of molecular movement, there
were many bits of physical knowledge,—optics, acoustics,
thermology, electrology, – but no physics. Physics became physico-
chemistry, the science of all inorganic nature, when the possibility
was seen of explaining all things by the fundamental laws of me-
chanics; that is, when men believed that they had discovered the
elementary inorganic facts, in the equality and contrariety of ac-
tion and reaction, the conservation of energy, the reduction of all
forces to forms of motion, the mechanical equivalent of heat, elec-
tricity, light, etc. Finally, before the discovery of the analogies
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duction, there was not a single botany and a single zoology, but
different botanies and zoologies, which might have been named
hippology, cynology, etc. The discovery of the abovementioned
resemblances gave only partial unity to these various scattered
sciences these disjecta membra of the coming biology. Biology
was really born when the cell theory appeared, exhibiting the el-
ementary fact of life, namely, that the functions of the cell (or
histological element) and its proliferation are continued by the
germ, itself a cell, so that nutrition and generation were thus seen
from the same angle of vision.
And now we are about to construct, in like manner, a social
science, to succeed the social sciences. For there were social sci-
ences, at least in outline,—the beginnings of political science, lin-
guistics, comparative mythology, aesthetics, and ethics, together
with a political economy already well advanced,—long before even
an embryo of sociology existed. Sociology requires a fundamen-
tal social fact. She requires it so urgently that, so long as she had
not succeeded in discovering any (possibly because the fact was
tearing out her eyes, if I may be pardoned the expression), she
was dreaming of such a fact, and imagining it in the form of one of
those idle, imaginary resemblances that beset the cradle of every
science; she believed herself to be asserting a highly instructive
fact when she pictured society as a great organism, where the
individual (or, according to others, the family) was the social cell,
and every form of social activity represented some sort of cellular
function. I have already made many efforts, in company with most
other sociologists, to sweep away this obstructive notion from
the path of the new science. Yet a word further on the subject may
be in place.
Scientific knowledge feels so strongly the need of relying on
resemblances and repetitions before all else, that, when none are
within its grasp, it actually creates imaginary ones to supply the
place of the real; among these we must class the famous simile of
the social organism, together with many other symbolic concepts
that have attained a like ephemeral usefulness. At the starting-
point of every science, as at the starting-point of every literature,30/Gabriel Tarde
allegory plays an important role. In mathematics, we find the alle-
gorical vision of Pythagoras and Plato preceding the solid gener-
alizations of Archimedes. Astrology and magic—the one the gate-
way to astronomy, the other the early babblings of chemistry—
are founded on the postulate of universal allegory, rather than
that of universal analogy; they assume a pre-established harmony
between the positions of certain planets and the destinies of cer-
tain men, between some fictitious act and some real one, between
the nature of a chemical substance and that of the heavenly body
whose name it bears, and so on. We must not forget the symbolic
character of primitive proceedings, for example, the actio legis, in
the Roman code, that early groping after jurisprudence. We should
note also (since theology, like jurisprudence, became a science
some time ago, the excessive application of figurative meanings
to biblical stories by the earlier theologians, who saw in the his-
tory of Jacob a copy by anticipation of the history of Christ, or
regarded the love of the husband and wife in the Song of Solomon
as symbolic of the love of Christ and his church. The medieval
science of theology began in this way, just as modern literature
began with the Romance of the Rose. It is a long step from such
notions to the Summa of St. Thomas Aquinus. Even down to the
present century we find lingering traces of this symbolic mysti-
cism; they appear in good Father Gratry’s works, now long for-
gotten, yet worthy to be resurrected on account of their Fénelonian
grace of style. Father Gratry believed that the solar system sym-
bolized the successive relations of the soul and God, as the former,
according to his notion, revolved around the latter. For him, again,
the circle and the ellipse symbolized the whole of ethics, a science
which he believed to be inscribed in hieroglyphics upon the conic
sections.
I have no desire, of course, to compare these eccentric views
with the partly substantial and always serious development which
Herbert Spencer and, more recently, M. René Worms and M.
Novicow, following Comte, have effected in the theory of the
“social organism.” I appreciate fully the merit and temporary use-
fulness of such work, even though I criticise it. But, to generalizeSocial Laws/31
now what precedes, I believe I have the right to lay down the
following proposition: The advance of every science consists in
suppressing external likenesses and repetitions,—that is, compari-
sons of the peculiar material of that science with other things,—
and replacing them by internal likenesses and repetitions,—that
is, comparisons of that material with itself, as it appears in its
many copies and under its different aspects. The notion of the
social organism, which regards the nation as a plant or animal,
corresponds to that of vital automatism, which regards the plant
or animal as a piece of mechanism. It is not this hollow and far-
fetched comparison of the living body with a piece of mechanism
that has advanced biology, but rather a comparison of plants with
one another, animals with one another, and living bodies with one
another.5 So, too, it is not by comparing societies with organisms
that sociology has already made great steps in advance and is
destined to make still greater ones in the future, but by comparing
various societies with one another; by noting the endless coinci-
dences between distinct national evolutions, from the standpoint
of language, jurisprudence, religion, industry, art, and custom;
and above all by attending to those imitations between man and
man which furnish an analytic explanation of the collective facts.
After these lengthy preliminaries, the time has come when it
would be in place to set forth the general laws governing imitative
repetition, which are to sociology what the laws of habit and he-
redity are to biology, the laws of gravitation to astronomy, and
the laws of vibration to physics. But I have fully treated this sub-
ject in one of my works, The Laws of Imitation, to which I may
refer those who are interested in the subject. Nevertheless, I think
it important to bring out here what I did not make sufficiently
clear, namely, that in the last analysis all these laws flow from a
higher principle—the tendency of an example, once started in a
social group, to spread through it in geometrical progression, pro-
vided the group remains homogeneous. By this term tendency,
however, I do not mean anything mysterious; on the contrary, it
denotes a very simple thing. When, for instance, in a group, the
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individual who finds an expressive image fitted to meet that need
has only to pronounce it, when immediately it is echoed from one
neighbor to another, till soon it trembles on every lip in the group
in question, and later spreads even to neighboring groups. Not
that we mean by this, in the least, that the expression is endowed
with a soul which causes it to send forth rays in this manner, any
more than the physicist, in saying that a sound-wave tends to ra-
diate in the air, means to endow this mere form with a personal,
eager, and ambitious force.6 It is only another way of saying, in
the one case, that the motor forces inherent in the molecules of air
have found, in this vibratory repetition, a channel into which they
drain; and, in the other case, that a special need felt by the human
beings of the group in question has found satisfaction in this imi-
tative repetition, which enables them, as a concession to their in-
dolence (the analogue of physical inertia), to escape the trouble
of inventing for themselves. However, the re is no doubt of the
tendency to spread in geometrical proportion, though this ten-
dency is often hindered by obstacles of various sorts, so that it is
quite rare, though not extremely so, for statistical diagrams relat-
ing to the spread of a new industrial invention to show a regular
progression. Now what are the obstacles referred to? There are
some that arise from differences of climate and race, but these are
not the most important. The greatest impediment to the spread of
a social innovation and its consolidation into a traditional custom
is some other equally expansive innovation which it encounters
during its course, and which, to employ a physical metaphor, in-
terferes with it. In fact, every time any one of us hesitates be-
tween two modes of verbal expression, two ideas, two beliefs, or
two modes of action, it means that an interference between two
imitation-rays takes place in him; these rays have started from
different generating centres, often widely separated in space and
time (namely, certain individual inventors and imitators of primi-
tive times), and have spread onward, till they reached the indi-
vidual in question. And how is his difficulty solved? What are the
influences that decide his course? There are influences, as I have
said elsewhere, of two kinds: logical and extralogical. I shouldSocial Laws/33
add that even the latter are logical in one sense of the term; for
while, between two examples, the plebeian selects blindly that of
the patrician, the countryman that of the townsman, and the pro-
vincial that of the Parisian—a phenomenon which I have called
the descent of imitation from the top to the bottom of the social
ladder—this very imitation, however blind it be, is influenced in
every case by the superiority attributed to the model, which makes
the example of the latter appear in the eyes of the form to possess
some social authority over him. The same is true when, as be-
tween his ancestors and some foreign innovator, primitive man
does not hesitate to prefer the example of the former, whom he
esteems infallible; and the same is true, only conversely, when, in
a similar perplexity, the denizen of our modern cities, persuaded
in advance that the new is always preferable to the old, makes
precisely the opposite choice. Nevertheless, the case where the
opinion of the individual is founded on reasons extrinsic to the
nature of the models compared and the two ideas or acts in oppo-
sition, should be carefully distinguished from the case where he
chooses in virtue of a judgment resting on the intrinsic character
of these two ideas or volitions; hence, the term logical should be
reserved for the influences that decide him in the latter case.
I need not discuss this question further at present, since in the
next chapter I shall have occasion to speak again of these logical
and teleological duels, which constitute the fundamental terms of
social opposition. Let me only add here that the interferences of
imitation-rays are not always impediments to each other’s progress;
often they result in mutual alliances, which serve to accelerate
and enlarge the radiation; sometimes they are even responsible
for the rise of some generic idea, which is born of their encounter
and combination within a single head, as we shall see in the chap-
ter devoted to social adaptation.
Notes:
1. The experiments that have been made on hypnotic suggestion, and
suggestion in the waking state, already furnish abundant material for
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refer the reader to the applications of this still embryonic psychology
which I have proposed throughout my works; more especially to the
chapter in my Laws of Imitation (1890), entitled: What is a society?
which appeared previously, in November, 1884, in the Revue
philosophique; also to some pages of my Philosophie pénale (Phi-
losophy of Punishment, 1890), on the formation of criminal crowds
(in the chapter on Crime, p. 324 f. 1st French edition); my report
entitled Les crimes des foules (The Crimes of Crowds), submitted at
the Congress for Criminal Anthropology at Brussels, in August, 1892,
and an article published in the Revue des Deux Mondes for Decem-
ber, 1893, under the title of Foules et sectes (Crowds and Sects). The
two latter studies were reprinted without change in my Essais et
mélanges sociologiques (Sociological Essays and Miscellanies),
which appeared in 1895 (Storck and Masson, publishers, Paris and
Lyons).—I may observe, by the way, that the passage from the
Philosophie pénale, cited above, which is merely a corollary of the
chapter cited also from the Laws of Imitation, contains in substance,
and very explicitly, the explanation of the phenomena of crowds which
was developed afterward in the two other works mentioned; this pas-
sage was published prior to the many interesting works that have
recently appeared in France and abroad on the psychology of crowds.
While this does not detract from their merit, it serves to answer a
certain number of insinuations against me, which I have, moreover,
fully met elsewhere.
2. Giving to the word imitation the very wide meaning accorded to it in
a recent and already celebrated book on Mental Development in the
Child and the Race, by Mr Baldwin, professor of psychology at
Princeton University (U.S.A.) one might regard imitation as the fun-
damental fact, not only of social and psychological life, but of or-
ganic life as well, where it would appear as the necessary condition
of habit and heredity. As a matter of fact, however, the position of
this keen psychologist, far from contradicting my own view, is a most
striking illustration and confirmation of it. Imitation between man
and man, as I understand it, is the consequence of imitation between
one state and another in the same man; the latter is a species of inter-
nal imitation which I had myself previously named habit, and is evi-
dently distinguished from the former by characteristics clear enough
to allow of their differentiation. Professor Baldwin, who is first of all
a biological psychologist, explains very correctly the organic andSocial Laws/35
mental genesis of imitation, an his task comes to an end where that of
the psychological sociologist begins. It is a pity that his book did not
precede my own on the Laws of Imitation, which would have gained
by using his analyses. Nevertheless, the latter do not oblige me to
amend in any way the laws and arguments formulated in my work.
But in any case his book is the best answer I can make to those who
accuse me of extending too widely the meaning of the word imitation.
Professor Baldwin proves the contrary by extending it much further
still. I learn, as these proofs are being corrected, that Professor Baldwin
has recently applied his conceptions to sociology, and that by an in-
dependent route he has been led spontaneously to a position very
analogous to that developed in my Laws of Imitation. [The work by
Professor Baldwin referred to is his Social and Ethical Interpreta-
tions in Mental Development (Macmillans). In the second English
edition of that work the author speaks of the relation of his researches
to those of M. Tarde.—TR.]
3. And do not forget this simple fact, that we enter upon the social life at
a very early age. Hence, the child, who turns to others as a flower
turns to the sun, feels the attraction of his family environment much
more than its constraint. And in the same way, throughout his entire
life, he continues to drink in these examples with avidity.
4. This conception is, in fact, almost the exact opposite of the unilinear
evolutionists’ notion and of M. Durkheim’s. Instead of explaining
everything by the supposed supremacy of a law of evolution, which
compels collective phenomena to reproduce and repeat themselves
indefinitely in a certain order,—instead of thus explaining lesser facts
by greater, and the part by the whole,—I explain collective resem-
blances of the whole by the massing together of minute elementary
acts—the greater by the lesser and the whole by the part. This way of
regarding phenomena is destined to work a transformation in sociol-
ogy similar to that brought about in mathematics by the introduction
of the infinitesimal calculus.
5. Similarly, it was not the Pythagorean comparisons between math-
ematics and various other sciences that advanced mathematics; such
comparisons were absolutely sterile, while the bringing together of
two branches of mathematics, geometry and algebra, under the guid-
ance of Descartes, was most fruitful. And it was only when the infini-
tesimal calculus was invented and men went back to the
indecomposable mathematical element whose continuous repetition36/Gabriel Tarde
explains all, that the immense fertility of mathematics fully appeared.
6. Or any more than the naturalist, when he says that a species tends to
increase in geometrical proportion, regards the type-form as possess-
ing an energy and aim independent of the sun, the chemical affinities,
and the various forms of physical energy, instead of being simply
their channel.Chapter II
The Opposition of Phenomena
Theoretically, the repetition aspect of phenomena is the most im-
portant one to consider; but their opposition aspect is of greater
practical interest, viewed from the standpoint of scientific appli-
cability. Yet, from the days of Aristotle down to the present, this
latter has been either completely misunderstood, or at least hid-
den from view amid the disordered mass of other differences.
Here, as in the former case, we may say that the progress of
science consists in doing away with the small number of superfi-
cial gross oppositions that were perceived or imagined at first,
and replacing them by countless profounder and subtler opposi-
tions, that are exceedingly difficult to discover; and that it involves
the substitution of internal for external oppositions in the subject
under discussion. We may further add that it also serves to clear
away certain apparent dissymmetries or asymmetries, and substi-
tute for them numerous others, deeper hidden and more instruc-
tive.
Consider the oppositions existing in the realm of stars. Day
and night and heaven and earth were the first antitheses proposed;
on these the theological cosmogonies, those embryos of astronomy
and geology, just beginning life, or striving to begin it, subsisted.
The next oppositions to appear possessed more truth, but they
were still misunderstood, or were entirely subjective or superfi-
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esis between up and down carried to its logical conclusion); the
four cardinal points of the compass set over against one another
in pairs; winter and summer, spring and autumn, morning and
evening, midday and midnight, the first and last quarters of the
moon, and so on. All these oppositions were retained, it is true,
even after the science grew older; nevertheless they lost much of
their original importance and significance. The west is not, for
savage races, as it is for us, merely a relative direction, defined
with respect to our position as we face the so-called polar star; to
them the west is the region of happiness after death, the everlast-
ing abode of souls; for others, the east fulfils this same role. Hence,
their ritual determines the direction that temples and tombs shall
face. The first and last quarters of the moon have assuredly not
the important imaginary meaning attributed to them by the super-
stitious tillers of the soil in primitive times, or even by our own
peasants. According to them, the new moon is the direct cause of
rapid growth, while the old moon hinders the growth of whatever
is planted during one or other of its two phases. This is a vestige
of the old antithesis between dies fasti and dies nefasti.
Thus, these oppositions have been preserved, but with a su-
perficial and conventionalized meaning. Others, again, have been
eliminated, as, for example, the opposition between celestial and
terrestrial, and between sun and moon; while the emphasis, as in
the former instances, has been transferred to other oppositions,
possessing a far deeper meaning. First, the discovery of the ellip-
tic, parabolic, or hyperbolic character of the orbits described by
stars, planets, and comets led to the perception of the complete
symmetry of the two halves of the orbit on either side of the major
axis. (That is, complete, aside from certain perturbations which
are reciprocal repetitions of the curves of one star by another,
within the same system.) Next, it was observed that the ellipses of
the planets’ courses increased and decreased alternately, with great
regularity, oscillating about a certain position of equilibrium. Fi-
nally, the most profound, widespread, and enduring opposition in
astronomy, and the basis of all the rest, is the equality of the at-
traction exerted upon every mass and molecule and that exertedSocial Laws/39
by it. Each attracts and is attracted in like degree. This is one of
the most beautiful illustrations of the physical law of universal
opposition, called the law of the equality and contrariety of action
and reaction.
Physics and chemistry, like astronomy, began with pseudo-
oppositions. The four elements imagined by the early physicists
were contrasted with one another in pairs: water as against fire,
and air as against earth. Innate antipathies were supposed to exist
between certain substances. More wholesome ideas respecting
the true nature of physical and chemical opposition were reached
when men discovered the characteristics of bases and acids, and
the sort of opposition between them; still more so, when they
discovered the two opposite kinds of electricity and the polarity
of light. The concept of polarity, which has played so important a
role in physico-chemical theories, marked a great advance over
previous conceptions, until it was itself explained by the concept
of undulations, into which its effects have been resolved, or are in
just as a fair way to be resolved. And light, heat, and electricity
appear to be spherical or linear propagations of vibrations at once
infinitely small and infinitely rapid, so there is a tendency to con-
sider chemical combination as an harmonious union and interlac-
ing of waves. But here we touch on the domain of adaptation.
Even attraction itself has often been explained as due to the im-
pacts of ether vibrations. However this may be, it is nevertheless
certain that the elliptical orbits of the stars are comparable, ex-
cept in respect to dimensions, to physical vibrations, since the
molecules follow an elongated elliptical course, and a rhythm of
undulation exists in both cases. In short, we observe how the field
of oppositions has been extended and broadened by the progress
of science, and how, in place of qualitative oppositions, there have
appeared those exact and rhythmic quantitative oppositions which
form the texture of the world-fabric. The wonderful symmetry of
crystalline forms in every chemical substance constitutes a graphic
interpretation and visual expression of the rhythmic oppositions
between those countless movements of which it is the embodi-
ment. And must we not also look to this rhythm of the internal40/Gabriel Tarde
movements of a body for the ultimate explanation of Mendelejeff’s
law, which shows us that the groups of substances form a number
of successive, rising scales, like a piano from whose keyboard
some keys here and there are missing, which we shall replace from
time to time?
But while the evolution of the physical sciences revealed cer-
tain oppositions and symmetries that were at once clearer, more
profound, and more satisfactory in the explanations they afforded,
it also brought to light certain asymmetries, lack of rhythm, or
inoppositions, of far greater importance. It showed, for example,
that in all our solar system there is no planetary body with a retro-
grade motion, that is, with a motion in the opposite direction to
that of the general run of planets; the only exception to this is in
the case of certain satellites. The form of the nebulae revealed by
our telescopes is often unsymmetrical. We have not the slightest
reason for believing that any relation of symmetry exists between
the evolution and dissolution of a solar system (if, indeed, there
be a dissolution), or between the formation of the successive geo-
logical strata in a planet, and its final separation into fragments, if
the ideas of M. Stanilas Meunier on this point be accepted. With
all the progress that astronomy has made, the scattering and group-
ing of the stars in the heavens remains, as before, a mighty ex-
ample of picturesque disorder and randomness. Indeed, this spec-
tacle of sublime disorder appears more striking as greater advances
have been made in the knowledge of forces in equilibrium and
symmetrically opposed, which form their apparent constituents.
What astronomer of to-day would dream, like the ancients, of an
anti-world, or antichthon, where everything exhibited the reverse
of the terrestrial order? Again, as the geography of our planet
becomes better known, we are more than ever struck with the
absence of symmetry in the form of its continents and mountain
chains, and Élie de Beaumont’s notion of the réseau pentagonal
no longer attracts any one. The advance of crystallography has
brought to notice dissymmetries hitherto unperceived, whose im-
portance have been set in relief by the work of Pasteur. But I can
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In the realm of life, the grosser and more obvious opposi-
tions, such as life and death, youth and old age, were the first to
be observed; these were the earliest correspondences noted be-
tween animals and plants, and formed the rudiments of general
biology. Moreover, it was impossible not to notice the symmetry
of living forms, so striking and strange because of its universality.
Yet, here, too, fancy gave birth to a host of oppositions unreal or
without value. Among them may be mentioned the angels and
demons, both of which were conceived as being superior species
of animals. Similarly, for the savage, and sometimes even for the
uncultured man of our day, the most important opposition in the
realm of life is between things that are good to eat and those that
are not, that is, between nutritious and poisonous plants, and be-
tween useful and harmful animals. Here we have an opposition
that is real in a subjective sense, but imaginary in so far as it is
believed to hold objectively, as it is by ignorant men of all races.
Physicians for a long time conceived of sickness and health as two
exactly opposite states, and believed that the causes of sickness
were the exact reverse of the causes of health. The error of
homoeopathy was due, at bottom, to this illusion. Sickness and
health, as thus conceived, are merely verbal entities, which the
advances of physiology have cast aside; pathological deviations
are phases of the physiological functions, instead of being op-
posed to them. The dissolution of the individual was also regarded
as the inverse of evolution, old age being considered as a return
of childhood. This view was only finally eliminated when embry-
ology brought to light the passage through a series of ancestral
forms, which have, obviously, no inverse analogue in the succes-
sive stages of senile decay.
Long after the sciences dealing with life were organized, physi-
ologists still imagined a certain artificial opposition, as well as a
scientific one, which they held existed between the animal and
vegetable kingdoms. In their eyes, vegetable respiration was ex-
actly the reverse of animal respiration; the former destroyed what
the latter produced, namely, the union of oxygen and carbon.
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others, demonstrated the superficial character of this opposition,
and established the fundamental unity of the two kingdoms, show-
ing them to be not inverse, but divergent. On the other hand, the
growth of knowledge eliminated these false or vague oppositions
between different groups of beings, different beings, and different
entities within the same being, and substituted countless real though
infinitesimal oppositions in the inmost nature of the tissues; for
example, the oxidation and deoxidation of each cell, or the gain
and loss of energy. Here, again, opposition appears most funda-
mental and fruitful under the form of rhythm, rather than in the
guise of strife.
But at the same time, certain new and more subtle dissymme-
tries were brought to light. To cite but a single instance, the study
of the cerebral functions, when it demonstrated the localization of
the speech function in the left hemisphere, established a very im-
portant dissymmetry of function between the two halves of the
brain. And this is not the only case where symmetry of form be-
tween corresponding organs of the two sides of the body, such as
the right and left hand, the right and left eye, etc., has been found
to cover a wide dissymmetry or asymmetry in their function. Be-
sides this, as I said above, that very ancient hypothesis, so plau-
sible in appearance, that the dissolution of living beings and types
must be exactly opposite to the manner of their evolution, was
forced to surrender before the advances of observation. And this
lack of symmetry between the two opposite slopes of life,—its
ascent and descent,—whether in individuals or in the species, has
an important meaning; for it goes to show that life is not a mere
play—a see-saw of forces, so to speak—but rather an act of go-
ing forward, and that the notion of progress is not an idle one. It
enables us to view the oppositions of phenomena, with all their
symmetries, struggles, and rhythms, and in like manner their rep-
etitions, as simply instruments or mean terms of progress.
Sociology gives rise to analogous reflections. In the begin-
ning (for in some respects the science is quite ancient), it started
as a mythology, and after the manner of mythologies it was satis-
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or imaginary wars of enormous dimensions between good and
gods of light and darkness, evil deities, or heroes and monsters.
But metaphysics made undue use of contests, quite as much as
mythology; for the metaphysicians also imagined oppositions be-
tween direct and reverse series, and held that developments of
humanity in one direction were followed by developments in the
contrary direction. On this point Plato and the Hindu philoso-
phers join hands. Hegel, with his sweeping generalizations, his
marshalling of different races under the banner of Antagonistic
Ideas, and Cousin, with his imaginary antithesis between Oriental
Infinity and Greek Finity, are excellent examples of the sociologi-
cal antinomies of the past. All this has vanished; and to-day, espe-
cially after the amazing Europeanization of Japan within the past
few years, we do not even venture to set the supposed immutabil-
ity of the Asiatics over against the supposed innate progressive-
ness of the European races.
The political economists have already rendered social science
a noteworthy service, by substituting for war, as the keynote of
history, the factor of competition, which is a species of war not
only modified and mollified, but at the same time dwarfed and
manifolded. Finally, if our point of view be adopted, the competi-
tion of desires and beliefs must be regarded as constituting the
basis of what political economists call the competition between
consumers and the competition between producers. Generalizing
this struggle, and extending it to every form existing in the social
life,—linguistic, religious, political, artistic, and moral, as well as
industrial,—we see that the really fundamental social opposition
must be sought for in the bosom of the social individual himself,
whenever he hesitates between adopting or rejecting a new pat-
tern offered him, whether in the way of phraseology, ritual, con-
cept, canon of art, or conduct. This hesitation, this miniature in-
ternal battle, which is renewed a million times every moment of a
nation’s life, constitutes the infinitely minute and infinitely fruitful
opposition that underlies history. It is producing a peaceful but
far-reaching revolution in the realm of sociology.
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and subordinate character of social opposition (even in its psy-
chological form) is shown by the appearance of a large number of
asymmetries and dissymmetries that did not at first reveal them-
selves. I find it necessary to distinguish (and on this point I find no
one to contradict me) between the reversible and the irreversible
in every species of social fact; and of these the irreversible have
always proved the more important category; as, for example, the
series of discoveries in science and the industrial life. Again, for
the very reason that the life of each social individual is composed
of such numerous psychological oppositions, there has been a real
accentuation of his individual characteristics, or his personality,
something which has no antithesis, and for which the so-called
genius of a people, or, if you prefer, the genius of a language, or a
religion, is merely a collective and abbreviated form of expres-
sion. We find, also, that the aesthetic side of the social life, the
side on which it can neither be compared nor opposed to any-
thing, is supported by this very interplay of infinite minute oppo-
sitions, which I have just described.
But this summary glance is very incomplete. It is important to
examine more closely this subject, which has been so little ex-
plored, though deserving of the greatest attention. Let us, first of
all, come to a clear understanding with regard to the different
meanings of the word opposition. In my work on Universal Op-
position I proposed a definition and a classification to which I
may be permitted to refer. Let us sum the matter up briefly from
our present point of view. Opposition is erroneously conceived
by the average thinker as the maximum degree of difference. In
reality, it is a very special kind of repetition, namely, of two simi-
lar things that are mutually destructive by virtue of their very simi-
larity. In other words, opposites or contraries always constitute a
couple or duality, they are not opposed to each other as beings or
groups of beings, for these are always dissimilar and, in some
respect, sui generis; nor yet as states of a single being or of differ-
ent beings, but rather as tendencies or forces. For, if we regard
certain forms or certain states, such as concave and convex, plea-
sure and pain, heat and cold, as opposites, it is by reason of theSocial Laws/45
real or assumed contrariety of the forces which produce these
states. Thus we see that it is necessary to eliminate from the start,
as so many pseudo-oppositions, all the antitheses of mythology
and the philosophy of history which are based on assumed natural
contrarieties; for example, the contrarieties between two nations,
two races, or two forms of government (such as republic and
monarchy, to cite certain Hegelians in this matter); or between
occident and orient, two religions (such as Christianity and
Mohammedanism), or two families of languages (such as the
Semitic and Indo-European). These contrasts chance to be par-
tially true, if we take into consideration the manner in which the
things in question deny or affirm the same notion, and desire or
reject the same end, under certain more or less ephemeral circum-
stances. But if the antipathy of these things for each other be re-
garded as essential, absolute, and innate, as many ancient philoso-
phers seemed to believe, they are wholly chimerical.
Thus, every real opposition implies a relation between two
forces, tendencies, or directions. But the phenomena by means of
which these two forces become actualities are of two kinds,—
qualitative and quantitative,—that is, they may be composed of
either heterogeneous or homogeneous parts. A series made up of
heterogeneous factors is a species of evolution that can always be
conceived of (whether rightly or wrongly) as reversible, or ca-
pable of going back by following the same road in precisely the
opposite direction. For example, if a chemist, taking a piece of
wood and going through a series of operations, ends by extract-
ing brandy from it, this does not of course imply that it would be
possible to reconstruct the piece of wood by a series of inverse
operations; yet if this is not a possibility, it is at least conceivable.
And this was the dream of the ancient philosophers with respect
to the transformations of humanity. A series made up of homoge-
neous factors is an evolution of a special sort, known as increase
or decrease, wax or wane, rise or fall. Without entering too mi-
nutely into the facts, we must notice how, as social science devel-
ops with the advance of civilization, instances of exact and mea-
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giving us fluctuations of the stock market and statistical diagrams
on which are registered in wave-like curves the rise and fall of
some particular security, of some particular species of crime, of
suicide, the birth-rate, marriage, or thrift as measured by the re-
turns. of the savings banks, insurance companies, etc.
The distinction just made is between oppositions of series (evo-
lution and counter-evolution) and oppositions of degree (increase
and diminution). A still more important category to be considered
consists of oppositions of sign, or, if we prefer, diametrical oppo-
sitions. Although these last are often confused with the preceding
in the language of mathematics, in which plus and minus symbol-
ize increase and diminution as well as positive and negative direc-
tions, it is nevertheless true that the alternate increase and de-
crease of a force acting always in the same direction constitutes a
very different sort of opposition from that of two forces, one of
which acts from A toward B, and the other from B toward A,
both along the same straight line. Similarly, the contrast between
the increase and decrease of a credit balance must not be con-
fused with the contrast between such a credit and an equal debt;
and the growth or diminution of the tendency to theft or crime, in
a given society, is quite a different thing from the antithesis be-
tween this tendency and the tendency to charity and philanthropy.
In order to give at once a psychological explanation of these and
many other social contrasts, we may observe that an increase fol-
lowed by a diminution of our affirmative belief in a notion, whether
religious or scientific, legal or political, is quite a different matter
from our affirmation followed by our rejection of this same idea,
and that an increase followed by a diminution of our desire for
something, for instance our love for a woman, is quite a different
matter from a desire followed by a repugnance to the same ob-
ject, such as our love toward this woman and then our hatred of
her. It is certainly interesting to note that each of these subjective
quantities, belief and desire, possesses two opposite signs, the
positive and negative, and that in this respect they admit of com-
parison with objective quantities, such as mechanical forces which
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constituted as to admit of an infinity of couples whose members
are opposed to each other in direction, and our consciousness is
so constituted as to admit of an infinity of affirmations opposed to
negations, or an infinity of desires opposed to repugnances, each
having precisely the same object. Except for these two unique
instances, whose coincidence is remarkable, the universe would
know neither war nor discord, and all the tragic side of life would
be both impossible and inconceivable.
One observation is necessary, however. The oppositions of
every sort—of series, degrees, or signs—may take place between
terms that find expression either in one and the same being (whether
molecule, Organism, or self), or in two different beings (molecules,
masses, organisms, or human consciousnesses). But we must dis-
tinguish carefully between these two cases. This is of primary
importance for the sake of another distinction that is no less es-
sential, namely, the distinction between the case where the terms
are simultaneous and the case where they are successive. In the
former there is a collision, strife, and then equilibrium; in the lat-
ter there is alternation and rhythm. In the former there is always
destruction and loss of energy; in the latter there is neither. Now
when any oppositions whatsoever, whether of series, degrees, or
signs, occur in two different beings, they may be either simulta-
neous or successive—either strife or rhythm. But when both of
their terms belong to one and the same being, body, or self, they
can only be both simultaneous and successive if they are opposi-
tions of signs. As for the oppositions of series and degrees under
this hypothesis, they admit only of a succession or alternation of
terms. For instance, it is impossible for the velocity of a body
moving in a given direction to increase and diminish at the same
time; it can only do so successively. But it may well happen that it
is impelled at the same time by two distinct forces to move in two
opposite directions; this is the case of equilibrium, which is often
characterized by a symmetry of opposite forms, notably in the
case of crystals. Similarly, it is impossible for the love of a man for
a woman to increase and diminish at the same time: such a thing
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and hate the same woman at the same time—an antinomy of the
heart that finds illustration in many crimes of passion. Again, it is
impossible for the religious faith of a man to increase and dimin-
ish at the same time: this can only occur successively; but it may
easily happen that he has in his thoughts, at the same time, though
often without being himself aware of it, a vigorous affirmation
and a no less vigorous if implicit denial of certain dogmas; that he
holds at once a certain Christian belief, and a certain worldly or
political prejudice which is opposed to it. Finally, it is evidently
impossible for one and the same molecule to pass through a cer-
tain series of chemical transformations and the inverse series at
the same time, or for the same man to be experiencing the same
psychological states in two opposite orders at the same time; that
can only occur successively. But, on the other hand, nothing is
more common than to observe, in a system of bodies, astronomi-
cal or otherwise, one body passing from aphelion to perihelion,
while another body is passing at the same time from perihelion to
aphelion; or one body that is accelerating its speed, while another
is slackening it. And nothing is more common than to observe, in
a society, one person’s ambition or faith increasing while the am-
bition or faith of another is declining; or, again, one person who,
in making a round trip, passes through a certain series of visual
impressions, while another, taking the opposite route, passes
through the same series of impressions in the inverse order.
A discussion of each of the species of oppositions here pointed
out would carry us beyond our limits. We must be satisfied with a
few general reflections. First, then, if external oppositions exist
(for so we may term the oppositions of tendencies between differ-
ent beings or men), they are rendered possible by the fact that
internal oppositions (between different tendencies within the same
being or man) exist or may exist. This applies to oppositions of
series and degrees as well as to oppositions of sign, but more
particularly to the latter. If certain men or groups of men are de-
veloping in one direction, while other men or groups of men are
developing in the contrary direction, it is because each individual
man can either develop or counterdevelop in this way; as, forSocial Laws/49
example, in the transition from naturalism to idealism, or from
idealism to naturalism, in art, and from an aristocracy to a democ-
racy, or vice versa, in government, etc. If religious faith is on the
increase among certain races or classes, while among others it is
on the decline, it is because the consciousness of each individual
man admits of either an increase or a diminution in the intensity of
religious faith. Finally, if there exist political parties and religious
sects which affirm and desire what other parties and sects deny
and reject, it is because the mind and heart of each individual man
is capable of containing both the yes and the no, the pro and the
con, with respect to any given concept or aim.
Nevertheless, I am far from wishing to identify external with
internal contests. In one sense they are incompatible; for it is only
when the internal struggle is ended, when the individual, after
having been pulled hither and thither by contrary influences, has
made his choice, and adopted a certain opinion or resolution rather
than some other—it is only when he has made peace with him-
self—that war between himself and those who have made the
opposite choice becomes possible. Nor is this of itself sufficient
to bring about such a war. The individual must know, in addition,
that the others have chosen the opposite of what he has himself
chosen. Without this, any external opposition of contraries, whether
simultaneous or successive, would be practically non-existent, for
it would present none of those characteristics that render an ex-
ternal struggle really effective. To bring about religious war or
strife, it is essential for every adherent of one faith to know that
the adherents of some other faith deny exactly what he affirms;
and this negation must be placed side by side in his consciousness
with his own affirmation, not as though adopted imitatively, but
rather as being definitely rejected by him, and hence redoubling
the intensity of his own belief. To bring about industrial competi-
tion, as, for instance, among the bidders at the sale of a house,
each one must know that his desire to possess the building is op-
posed by his competitors, who wish him not to get it; and he will
desire all the more to get possession of it, if he knows that the rest
do not wish him to do so. Without this, mere competition would50/Gabriel Tarde
be fruitless, and political economists have erred here in not clearly
distinguishing the special case where there exists, in the minds of
the competitors, no knowledge at all of the competition, from the
varying measure of that knowledge, as shown in the infinite num-
ber of degrees that separate complete understanding from com-
plete ignorance of the fact.
This was my ground for saying, as I did further back, that the
fundamental social opposition must be sought, not, as one might
be tempted to think, at first sight, in the relation of two contrary
or contradictory individuals, but rather in those logical and teleo-
logical duals, those curious combats between thesis and antith-
esis, between willing and nilling, whose stage is the conscious-
ness of the social individual. Of course the question may be asked:
If this be true, how does this social opposition differ from any
purely psychological opposition? To this I reply: It differs in cause,
and still more in effect.
First, as to its cause. When a solitary individual receives from
his senses two apparently contradictory impressions, he hesitates
between two sense judgments, one of which says that that spot
down there is a lake, while the other denies it. Here is an internal
opposition of purely psychological origin, a thing which occurs
but seldom, however. Indeed, we may assert without fear of error
that every doubt or hesitation experienced by even the most iso-
lated man belonging to the most savage of tribes is due to an
encounter within himself, either of two rays of instances which
come together and interfere in his brain, or else of a single ray of
instances which runs athwart of some sense perception. In writ-
ing, I often hesitate between two synonymous phrases, each of
which appears preferable to the other under the given circum-
stances; here it is two rays of imitation that interfere within me—
I refer to the two human series which, beginning with the first
inventor of each of these phrases, have reached on down to my-
self. For, each of these phrases I learned from some individual,
who learned it from some other, and so on up to the first one who
uttered it. (This, let me say again, is what I mean by a ray of
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derived from any single inventor, originator, or innovator, whose
pattern is reproduced, is what I call an imitative radiation. Our
social life includes a thick network of radiations of this sort, with
countless mutual interferences.) Or, take other instances. Sup-
pose I am a judge, and hesitate between a view based on a series
of decrees following an opinion promulgated by some author, such
as Marcadé or Demolombe, and an opposing view resting on an-
other series of decrees emanating from some other commentator;
this, again, is an interference of two imitative rays. Similarly, when
I hesitate between gas and electricity as a means of illuminating
my apartment. On the other hand, when a young peasant, observ-
ing the sunset, is at a loss whether to believe his schoolmaster,
who assures him that the fall of night is due to the motion of the
earth and not to the motion of the sun, or the testimony of his
senses, which tell him the contrary, in such a case there is but a
single imitative ray, which, reaching out through his schoolmas-
ter, unites him with Galileo; nevertheless this is sufficient to ren-
der his hesitation, his own internal opposition, social in origin.
But it is above all in its effects, or rather in its lack of effectu-
ality, that purely individual opposition differs from the fundamen-
tal form of social opposition, though the latter is individual also.
Sometimes the individual’s hesitation remains shut up within him-
self, and is neither reproduced nor tends to spread by imitation
among his neighbors; in this case the phenomenon remains purely
individual. But more often doubt itself is almost as contagious as
faith, and any person who becomes sceptical in an environment
that is fervent through force of example, is soon the source of a
scepticism that radiates out from him and about him. Can we deny,
in this case, the social character of the internal strife which each
individual of this group experiences?
But let us face the question in a still more general way. When
an individual becomes aware of a contradiction existing between
one of his conclusions, aims, notions, or habits,—such as a dogma,
turn of phraseology, commercial procedure, species of arm or tool,
etc.,—and the conclusion, aim, notion, or habit of some other
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may allow himself to be completely influenced by the other, and
abruptly abandon his own mode of thinking or acting; in this case
there is no internal strife, the victory occurs without a struggle,
and presents one of the many instances of imitation which make
up the social life. On the other hand, our individual may only half
submit to the other’s influence; this is the case we were consider-
ing above, and the shock is here followed by a diminution of its
force, so that it becomes more or less weakened and paralyzed.
Or, finally, he may actively oppose the strange action or habit,—
the belief or volition with which he has come in contact,—and
assert or desire all the more strenuously what he asserted and
desired before. Yet, even in this last case, where he rouses all the
strength of his conviction or passion to repel another’s example,
he experiences a certain unrest, an internal strife—though of an-
other sort, it is true, and as inspiring as the former was enervat-
ing. This unrest, also, for the very reason that it results from an
over-excitement and not a paralysis of one’s individual force, is
likely to spread contagiously; and this is what causes the splitting
up of a society into parties. A new party always consists of a
group of persons who, one after another and copying one an-
other, have adopted a notion or course contrary to that which had
hitherto reigned in their midst, and with which they themselves
had been imbued. On the other hand, this new dogmatism, be-
coming more intense and intolerant as it spreads, raises against
itself a coalition of those who, remaining faithful to tradition, have
made exactly the opposite choice, and thus two fanatical parties
find themselves face to face.
So we see that, whether in a violent, dogmatic form, or in a
weaker, sceptical one, the juxtaposition of two opposite terms is
social in character, provided it spreads by imitation. Were the case
otherwise, we would be compelled to say that there is nothing
social in such facts as these: the rivalry of two languages, as, for
example, French and German, or French and English, on their
respective frontiers, in Belgium, Switzerland, and the Channel
Islands; or the rivalry of two religions which are neighbors. One
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as a result of ceaseless battles waged, not between rival human
beings, but within each individual mind and consciousness, be-
tween two rival phrases or faiths. Is there anything that presents a
greater sociological interest than these alluvial deposits of lan-
guage and religion? Psychological oppositions, then, work them-
selves out in a social way, and it is always proper to go back to
that starting-point. Nevertheless, it is quite important not to con-
fuse the two forms in which opposition presents itself,—the one,
where the struggle of the two juxtaposed terms takes place in the
individual himself, and the other, where the individual adopts but
one of the opposing terms, although the two are placed side by
side within him, and where, consequently, the struggle occurs only
in his relations with other men. One may ask himself in this con-
nection, as I asked long ago, in one of my first articles,1 which is
worse for a society: to be divided into parties and sects fighting
over opposing programmes and dogmas, and into nations con-
tinually warring with one another, or to be composed of individu-
als at peace with one another, but each individually striving within
himself, a prey to scepticism, irresolution, and discouragement?
Is it better to enjoy this superficial peace, which covers up a state
of fierce and ceaseless war in minds wrestling with themselves, or
shall we admit that the bloodiest wars, even religious wars and
the attacks of political fever which characterize the most blood-
thirsty revolutions, are preferable to that torpor? Were it true that
we must choose between these two solutions, it must be admitted
that the social problem would be exceedingly difficult to settle.
And does it not appear to be true? Does it not seem as though the
moment men ceased to make war upon one another on the battle-
field, or to fight one another desperately in the arena of industrial
or political competition, they fell into the profound uneasiness
characteristic of anxious, vacillating, and discouraged souls, wa-
vering between priests and doctors who contradict one another,
between the time-honored maxims of a lip-worshipped ethics and
the opposing practices of an ethics that dares not as yet declare
itself? And when men put an end to their internal divisions,
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of conduct, do they not range themselves into two camps, ac-
cording to the different choice they have made, and proceed once
more to fight one another? We should have to choose, then, be-
tween external war and internal strife. Such would seem to be the
ultimate dilemma confronting those who dream of a perpetual
peace, among whom I number myself.
Fortunately, the truth is not so sad and discouraging as they
make out. Observation proves that every condition of strife,
whether external or internal, always aims at, and ends by passing
into, a decisive victory or a treaty of peace. As far as internal
strife is concerned, whether we call it doubt, irresolution, anguish,
or despair, one thing, at least, is evident: this sort of struggle al-
ways appears as an exceptional and transient crisis, and no one
should take it upon himself to consider it the normal state of af-
fairs or to judge it preferable (with all its painful agitations) to the
so-called effeminate peace involving regular work under the guid-
ance of a decided will and a securely formed judgment. And as
regards external strife, the struggle among men, can it be other-
wise? If history be correctly interpreted, it shows that war is for-
ever developing in one particular direction, and that this course,
repeated hundreds of times and easy to disentangle among the
thickets and undergrowth of history, seems to indicate its ultimate
disappearance, after it has gradually become rarer. In fact, as a
result of that imitative radiation, which labors constantly and, so
to speak, clandestinely to enlarge the special field of social phe-
nomena, all the latter are in process of enlargement, and war is
participating in the movement. From a countless number of very
small but exceedingly bitter wars between petty clans, we pass to
a smaller number of somewhat larger and less rancorous wars:
first between small cities, then between large cities, then between
nations that are continually growing greater, till finally we arrive
at an era of very infrequent but most impressive conflicts, quite
devoid of hatred, between colossal nations, whose very greatness
makes them inclined to peace.
Let me stop here to observe that, in thus passing from the
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to very rare cases of the great, the evolution of war, and of social
phenomena generally, seems to contradict the evolution of the
sciences as I have hitherto described it. Yet, as a matter of fact, it
only serves as an indirect proof and confirmation. For since ev-
erything in the world of facts proceeds from small to great, every-
thing in the world of ideas, which reflects it as though reversed in
a mirror, naturally proceeds from great to small, and in the course
of its analysis comes upon the elementary facts and real explana-
tions only at the end of its journey.
To return now to the main discussion. At each of these suc-
cessive stages and expansions, which are chiefly processes of
tranquillization, war as a whole has diminished, or, at least, been
transformed in a manner tending toward its ultimate disappear-
ance. Each aggrandizement of states, as they grew from tribes to
cities, and from cities to kingdoms, empires, and immense federa-
tions, meant the suppression of warfare in a region ever more
widely extended. There have always been on the earth, down to
the present day, certain regions, sometimes quite limited, each of
which was long regarded by its inhabitants as forming a sort of
universe by itself; for example, a valley shut in by mountains, a
large island, a bit of continent nearly cut off from the rest, and
later on the entire circumference of an inland sea. When this minia-
ture universe was pacified by a series of conquests which put ev-
ery locality in it under the same yoke, it seemed as if the final end
sought for universal peace—were attained. Such a momentary
respite occurred in the empire of the Pharaohs, the Chinese Em-
pire, the Peru of the Incas, certain isles of the Pacific, and the
Roman Empire. Unfortunately, no sooner was this fascinating goal
dimly seen, than it fled farther away; the earth appeared larger
than had been suspected; relations, first pacific, then belligerent,
were set up with powerful neighbors, whose very existence had
hitherto not been suspected; these must be conquered or conquer,
if the world’s peace was to be firmly established. The develop-
ment of war is, in fact, a gradual extension of the area of peace.
But this extension cannot go on indefinitely; this flitting mirage
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we have long since encircled it. What characterizes especially our
own epoch and differentiates it widely, in a sense, from the entire
past, although the laws of history apply to it no less nor more than
to its predecessors, is this: that now, for the first time in history,
the international polity of the great states of civilization embraces
within its purview, not merely a single continent, or two at most,
but the whole globe, so that the last stage of the evolution of war
is at length discovering itself, in a vista so dazzling that we can
scarcely believe our eyes; the end of this vista is certainly difficult
to attain, but it is a real end, and no deception this time, and it can
no longer move away as we approach it. Is there not something in
this fitted to inspire every heart? After establishing peace on the
borders of a river, such as the Nile or the Amur, and on the coasts
of a small sea,—after playing first a fluvial and then a Mediterra-
nean role, as Metchnikoff has pointed out, and as the laws of
imitative radiation explain to perfection,—civilization is in a fair
way to become oceanic, that is to say, worldwide; and the critical
period of growth being now past, the grand harvest season is about
to begin.
It is, of course, true that when war is at an end the painful
struggles among mankind will not be found to have disappeared
entirely. There are other forms of strife besides war, notably com-
petition. But what has just been said applies also to competition,
which is a social opposition of the economic instead of the politi-
cal type. Like war, competition proceeds from the small to the
great, and from very numerous instances of the very small to very
infrequent instances of the very great. Ever since its inception,
competition has appeared in three forms: as among the producers
of the same article, as among the consumers of the same article,
and between producer and consumer or seller and buyer of the
same article. For, as respects different articles, there is no mutual
opposition of desires; there is, rather, a mutual adaptation, when
the articles in question are capable of being exchanged.
Since we touch here on a very delicate question, which can be
approached for the present only from a special side, and without
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make one or two remarks, whose truth is not open to question.
Competition is an ambiguous word which signifies at once, or in
turn, joint action and contest,2 and this is why a dispute goes on
incessantly between those who, seeing only the opposition aspect
of this equivocal phenomenon, rightly deprecate it, and those who,
regarding it only from the adaptation side, laud it for the civilizing
inventions it has brought about. However, it is only the unfavor-
able side that we are considering here.
It is not at all essential that the desires of the different con-
sumers or the different producers of the same article should con-
flict or contradict one another; not even when the desires of some
are confronted with the desires of others. The producer and the
buyer are always in accord to this extent, that one wishes to buy
what the other wishes to sell; true, it is not always at the same
price, but there is always some price that brings them into agree-
ment and ends the dispute between them. Nor are the desires of
the producers in any respect contradictory, so long as each has his
own particular patronage and market, inextensible for the time
being, like his production; they come into conflict only when, with
the extension of the facilities of production, each desires to pro-
duce more, and to appropriate to his own advantage the produc-
tion of others. It is true that as civilization results in a constant
growth of the power of production, this strife between co-pro-
ducers is inevitable and bound to become constantly more severe.
Finally, as regards the desires of the consumers of a given article,
we may say that, far from being mutually injurious, the competi-
tors for the purchase of an article more frequently aid one an-
other, when the production of that article is of such a character as
to proceed pari passu with its consumption: thus, the more people
there are who wish to purchase bicycles, the more the price of
bicycles will fall. The desires of the consumers are really contra-
dictory only in case the supply of the article in question is less
than the demands for it, as frequently happens with the prime
necessities of life and also the greatest luxuries—and in case the
supply cannot be increased as rapidly as the desire for it increases
through the contagious influence of fashion.58/Gabriel Tarde
To return to our previous discussion, after making these ex-
planations, it should be observed that each of the three kinds of
competition here distinguished obeys the law already pointed out.
As between buyer and seller, the petty bargainings of the small
markets of primitive times were ceaseless and innumerable. Gradu-
ally these are done away with, but only to be replaced by those
greater sales to which the imposition by the municipal councils of
a municipal tax on wheat or meat gives rise. When these are abol-
ished in turn, they are replaced by still greater transactions, and
by discussions in parliament concerning measures which aim to
promote the interests of the mass of producers or the mass of
consumers in the nation, by imposing or abolishing certain cus-
toms duties. The so-called consumers’ co-operative societies, that
is, societies in which the consumer and producer are one, are born
of the desire to put an end to this species of competition and they
develop with the latter. Among purchasers, the competition goes
on increasing also.3 In small primitive markets the competition for
a sack of flour or head of cattle is limited to a few persons. When
these markets begin to extend and diminish in number, these count-
less little competitions end either in an amalgamation of interests,
or too often in little local monopolies, and are succeeded by more
extensive competitions, that grow constantly more extensive, till
they also culminate either in important unions, such as the agri-
cultural syndicates, or in vaster monopolies, such as the gigantic
kartells or trusts with which we are all familiar.
But let us turn to the form of competition which has been
most studied, and which is in reality the fiercest, because it is the
most clearly perceived; namely, that between producers. It begins
with countless rivalries among petty merchants who contend over
miniature markets, originally side by side, yet almost without com-
munication. But as the latter, breaking down their barriers, pass
over into greater but less numerous markets, the petty rival shops
also consolidate, either voluntarily or perforce, into greater but
less numerous factories, in which the work of production, hith-
erto a prey to its own jealous opposition, is now harmoniously
coordinated; and the rivalry of these factories reproduces, on aSocial Laws/59
larger scale, the former rivalry of the shops, until, with the gradual
expansion of the markets, which tend to become a single market,
we arrive at a stage where there remain merely a few giants of
industry and commerce, which are still rivals, unless, indeed, they
also have come to some understanding.
In short, competition develops in concentric circles, which
are continually enlarging. But the underlying condition and raison
d’être of this enlargement of competition is the enlargement of
association. Of association or monopoly, our opponents will in-
sist. Granted; yet monopoly is but one of two solutions which the
problem of competition admits, just as imperial unity is but one of
two solutions to the problem of war. The former problem may be
solved by association of individuals, as the latter is capable of
solution by a federation of peoples. Moreover, monopoly itself,
as it extends, becomes alleviated, and if, in certain kinds of pro-
duction, it should become universal,—the goal toward which it is
tending, and which N. Paul Leroy Beaulieu is, I believe, wrong in
considering absolutely and forever unattainable,4—it would prob-
ably be more bearable, often times, than the condition of acute
competition whose place it takes. Competition, then, tends either
to monopoly (at least a partial and relative one) or to the associa-
tion of competitors, just as war leads to a crushing of the van-
quished, or to the conclusion of a fair treaty with him—in either
case, to at least a partial and relative pacification. The growth of
conquering states led to this same result. The great modern states,
taking the place of the medieval fiefs, inaugurated a reign of peace
which has hitherto, I admit, been incomplete and brief, but which
is increasing in extent and duration, like the great armaments of
the present day. To deny that competition passes over into mo-
nopoly (or into association), and to believe that we are thereby
defending competition against those who decry it, is simply to
reject the one excuse that can be put forward in its favor. It is just
as though, in order to defend militarism against the attacks that
have been made upon it, we strove to demonstrate that war did
not bring peace in its train, as a consequence of victory. War, it is
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out of peace, on a far grander scale; and so, too, competition only
resolves itself temporarily into association that it may reappear
again, out of association, in the form of rivalries between associa-
tions, corporations, syndicates, and so on. But in this way we
finally arrive at a certain limited number of gigantic associations
which, not being open to further growth, can only associate to-
gether, after having fought one another awhile.
A third great form of social strife is discussion. This is doubt-
less implied in the preceding; but, if war and competition are dis-
cussions, one is a discussion in deeds of blood, the other a discus-
sion in deeds of ruin. Let us say a word now with regard to verbal
discussion, pure and simple. This, too, when it develops,—for
there are any number of little private discussions which, fortu-
nately, do not develop, but die on the spot,—develops in the way
just described, though here the process is far less obvious. It is
only after the menial discussion between contradictory ideas within
the same mind has ended (this should not be forgotten), that any
verbal discussion is possible between two men who have solved
the question differently. Similarly, if verbal, written, or printed
discussions between groups of men, and groups that are ever wid-
ening, takes the place of verbal discussion between two men, it is
because the more limited discussion has been brought to an end
by some relative and temporary agreement, or some sort of una-
nimity. These groups are first split up into an endless multitude of
little coteries, clans, churches, forums, and schools, which com-
bat one another; but at length, after many polemics, they are welded
into a very small number of great parties, religions, parliamentary
groups, schools of philosophy, and schools of art, which engage
one another in mortal combat. Was it not thus that the Catholic
faith became gradually established? In the first two or three cen-
turies of the Church’s history, countless discussions, always in-
tense and often bloody, were waged among the members of each
local church, ending in their agreeing upon a creed; but this creed,
disagreeing in certain particulars with those of neighboring
churches, gave rise to conferences and provincial councils, which
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with one another, and were forced to carry their disputes higher
up, to national or oecumenical councils. The political unity of
ancient France, under a monarchical form of government, was
similarly brought about; and the political unity of modern France,
along democratic lines, is in process of construction in the same
way. What I may call linguistic unity (that is, the unity of national
language, which succeeds rivalries among dialects and provin-
cialisms that resist the purifying tendency) has been similarly es-
tablished. The unity of legal codes has long since been accom-
plished in an analogous manner: countless local customs have
arisen, settling thousands of individual discussions concerning
rights (though not all, as the court records prove); these customs,
coming into conflict with one another, have been reconciled by
certain sectional customs, which have finally been replaced by
uniform legislation. The unity of science, operating slowly over a
wide field, through a succession of discussions, alternately settled
and reopened, among scientists and scientific schools, would give
rise to similar reflections.
Among these various forms of discussion, one in particular
deserves attention, namely, judicial discussion or the trial of civil
suits. Is it true that the scope of judicial procedure is likewise
enlarging, and by this very growth is rushing to its own extinc-
tion? However strange this proposition may appear at first, it is
certainly true. In the first place, it is clear that, among primitive
peoples, trials were in no way different from private wars; in fact,
except for the presence of the sovereign judge, the state, most of
the differences between litigants would have ended in blows. Tri-
als are modified duels; they are wars in embryo. And, conversely,
wars are law-suits between nations; they are a litigation that has
attained its natural development, through the absence of any su-
pra-national authority. If, then, we compare the judicial contests
of to-day that occur before tribunals, with those of the Middle
Ages, where the parties concerned were armed champions, or
with the earlier ones between kindred tribes, we must acknowl-
edge that the heat of litigation has continually grown less. And I
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In fact, we may say that the scope of legal questions has been
extended, as local customs gave place to provincial customs, and
finally to national laws; at each step in the process of judicial uni-
fication, every kind of law-suit (that is, every question of right)
leads to two diametrically opposite opinions, and thus becomes
more general in character. Now it is through just such a process
of generalization that every kind of discussion finally arrives at its
last stage: a decision of the Supreme Court, which dries up the
fountain-head of this species of suit. How many fountain-heads of
this sort have been dried up, even within the present century!
The objection may possibly be raised that as races become
more civilized they tend more and more to discussion, and that,
far from taking the place of private discussion, our public discus-
sions, polemics of the press, and parliamentary debates only add
fuel to them. But such an objection would be without force. For if
savages and barbarians discuss little (which is fortunate, since most
of their discussions degenerate into quarrels and combats), it is
because they scarcely speak or think at all. When we consider the
very small number of their ideas, we ought to be surprised that
they clash so often, relatively speaking; and we should marvel to
find men with so few different interests so quarrelsome. On the
other hand, a thing which we ought to wonder at, but which we
scarcely notice, as a matter of fact, is this: that in our own civi-
lized cities, despite the great current of ideas sweeping over us in
conversation and reading, there are, on the whole, so few discus-
sions, and these so lacking in warmth. We should be amazed to
find that men who think and talk so much contradict one another
so seldom, to see that they accomplish so much and clash so little;
just as we should wonder at seeing so few carriage accidents in
our streets, which are so animated and crowded, or at seeing so
few wars break out in this era of complex and far-reaching inter-
national relations. What is it, then, that has brought us into agree-
ment on so many points? It is the three great productions, that
have been gradually wrought out by centuries of discussion,
namely, Religion, Jurisprudence, and Science. We may note, also,
that in a civilized country public discussions far exceed privateSocial Laws/63
ones in importance, lively interest, and earnestness, even, while in
a barbarous land the reverse is true. Our parliamentary sessions
are increasing in violence, while the tone of discussions in the
café and the drawing-room is softening.5
To sum up. The strife of opposition in human society, in its
three principal forms—war, competition, and discussion—proves
obedient to one and the same law of development, through ever
widening areas of temporary pacification, alternating with renew-
als of discord more centrally organized and on a larger scale, and
leading up to a final, at least partial, agreement. It would appear
from this—and we have many other reasons for the conclusion—
that the strife of opposition fulfils the role of a middle term in the
social, as it does in the organic and inorganic, worlds, and that it
is destined gradually to fade away, exhaust itself, and disappear,
as a result of its own growth, which is merely a progress toward
its own destruction.
Indeed, it is now a favorable moment for stating, or rather
restating more explicitly, the relation between those three great
scientific aspects of the universe which I call the Repetition, Op-
position, and Adaptation of phenomena. The last two arise out of
the first, and the second is usually, though not always, an interme-
diary between the first and third. It is because physical forces
spread, or tend to spread, in a geometrical ratio, by their own
wave-like repetitions, that they interfere, or, on the other hand,
combine adaptively; their shocks of interference apparently serve
only as preparations for their unions of interference, that is, their
combinations. It is because living species tend to increase in a
geometrical ratio by the hereditary repetition of individual copies,
that they interfere, and give rise, either to felicitous and fruitful
cross-breeds or to the struggles for existence so carefully studied
by the Darwinians, who regard vital interference only from its
sanguinary side, considering it, with obvious exaggeration, as the
sole or chief factor in the creation of new species, that is, in the
readaptation of old species. And, similarly, it is because certain
social phenomena, such as a dogma, phrase, scientific principle,
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in a geometrical ratio by imitative repetition, that they interfere
with one another in a felicitous or infelicitous manner. That is, the
discordant sides of their nature come together in certain minds,
giving rise to logical or teleological duels, which constitute first
germs of social oppositions (wars, competitions, and polemics);
while the harmonious sides of their nature come together in the
mind of the genius, or sometimes even in the ordinary mind, pro-
ducing true logical syntheses, inventions, and fruitful originations,
which are the source of all social adaptation.
These three terms constitute a circular series which is capable
of proceeding on and on without ceasing. It is through imitative
repetition that invention, the fundamental social adaptation, spreads
and is strengthened, and tends, through the encounter of one of
its own imitative rays with an imitative ray emanating from some
other invention, old or new, either to arouse new struggles, or
(perhaps directly, perhaps as a result of these struggles) to yield
new and more complex inventions, which soon radiate out imita-
tively in turn, and so on indefinitely. Observe that the logical duel,
the fundamental term in the social struggle of opposition, like
logical synthesis, the fundamental term in social adaptation, re-
quires repetition in order to become social, to become general-
ized, and grow. But with this difference: the imitative spread of
the internal condition of discord between two ideas, or even of
the external state of discord between two men, one of whom has
chosen one of these ideas and the other the other, is bound to use
up and put an end to this discord in the course of time, since every
combat is exhausting and results in some victory; whereas the
imitative spread of the state of harmony, whether internal or ex-
ternal, which finds expression in the lighting up of a new beacon
of truth, is a synthesis of our previous knowledge, or a commun-
ion between our minds and all other minds that see its beams, and
hence has no reason to be arrested, but rather becomes strength-
ened as it advances. Thus, of the three terms compared, the first
and third far surpass the second in height, depth, importance, and
possibly also duration. The only value of the second—opposi-
tion—is to provoke a tension of antagonistic forces fitted to arouseSocial Laws/65
inventive genius; such is a military invention which, by placing
victory in one camp, temporarily ends war; an industrial invention
which, having been adopted or monopolized by some one among
the various industrial rivals, insures his triumph, and temporarily
puts an end to competition; or some philosophical, scientific, le-
gal, or aesthetic invention, which suddenly puts an end to count-
less discussions, though at the risk of giving birth to new ones
later on. This is the sole value of opposition, its only raison d’être.
Yet how often does the invention that it calls for fail to respond!
How often does war cut down genius, instead of raising it up!
How many talents are rendered worthless by the polemics of the
press, parliamentary debates, or even the foolish fencings of con-
gresses and associations! All that we can say—and this supports
the conclusions above reached—is that the historic order of suc-
cession in preponderance, among the three forms of struggle men-
tioned, is precisely the order of their fitness to stimulate inven-
tiveness. Thus man has passed from an era where war was domi-
nant to a phase where competition predominated, and finally to
an age of discussion. Moreover, as society becomes civilized, ex-
change develops faster than competition, conversation faster than
discussion, and internationalism faster than militarism.
We have thus far spoken only of the strife oppositions, that is,
the oppositions that occur between simultaneous terms which
collide. As regards rhythmic oppositions, which consist of suc-
cessive terms,—whether qualities or quantities it matters not,—
such as an alternate rise and fall, come and go, etc., it would seem
at first sight as if these were less enigmatic than the former, inas-
much as they do not involve any paralysis and mutual destruction
of forces. But, looking at the matter more closely, we see that this
come and go of forces, which act in turn for and against, or pro-
nounce alternately a yes and a no, is even more difficult to under
stand than the interaction of two forces that collide and then come
to an equilibrium. The destructive interferences present at least
an appearance of accident and unexpectedness, and we know them
to be scarcely separable from creative interferences, such as the
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or mutual neutralization of opposite tendencies in us, including
those due to rival suggestions from without, permit our natural
characteristics to come to light, which is perhaps one of the best
justifications of the phenomenon of strife. But rhythm appears to
be a normal play of forces which voluntarily accommodate them-
selves to one another, whether it be in qualitative or quantitative
rhythm. Indeed, I admit that I would be filled with a
Schopenhauerian despair, were there serious grounds for suppos-
ing that this come and go, this childish see-sawing back and forth,
held true on a large scale, that the process of dissolution was the
exact inverse of evolution, regression the inverse of progress, and
that everything proceeded forthwith to begin over again, indefi-
nitely, without any resulting coordination. Fortunately, this is not
the case; for rhythm, that regular and somewhat exact rhythm
which alone is worthy of the name, appears only in the details of
phenomena, as a condition of their exact repetition, and through
this of their variation. The orbit of a heavenly body repeats itself
only by reason of its passing to and fro in an ellipse; similarly, a
sound-wave or a light-wave repeats itself only by reason of its
rectilinear or circular or elliptical path to and fro; the contraction
of a muscular element and the innervation of a nervous element
are propagated in the muscle or along the nerve only by means of
a minute circular process which returns again to its own starting-
point; and Baldwin has recently shown that imitation itself is a
“circular reaction,” and that it may be defined as a “brain-state
due to stimulating conditions, muscular reaction which reproduces
or retains the stimulating conditions, same brain-state again due
to same stimulating conditions, and so on.” In the work from which
this quotation is taken, he extends the meaning of the word imita-
tion far beyond that which I assigned it; and, generalizing the term
in such a way as to include both the vital and the social functions,
he writes: “The self-repeating or circular type of reaction, to which
the name imitation is given.... is seen to be fundamental and to
remain the same, as far as structure is concerned, for all motor
activity whatever.” But repetition, the regular, rhythmic succes-
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and evolution, which is always more or less irregular and pictur-
esque, and becomes more so as it progresses. Now, rhythmic outgo
and return exhibits some exactness, it is true, but only in its order
of succession, not in its course. This is the case even with quanti-
tative rhythm, including those general instances of rise and fall
that statistics finds a means of measuring along the path of a civi-
lization in process of development. It is exceedingly seldom that
the increase and decrease observed here are equal and similar; for
instance, that the ascending curves representing wealth, the price
of securities on exchange, religious faith, education, criminality,
etc., are found to be oppositely reflected in descending curves,
presenting the same general and special characteristics. This is
well known to statisticians. I have myself noted elsewhere the
irreversible character of a host of social evolutions, which are the
most important of any. I need not return to that question here.
We conclude, then, that opposition, in its two great forms,
reveals and accentuates ever more clearly its own auxiliary and
intermediate character. As rhythm, it is only of direct service to
repetition, and of indirect service to variation, and it disappears
when the latter appears. As strife, it is only of use in stimulating
adaptation, with which we may now proceed to deal.
Notes:
1. An article incorporated later into my Laws of Imitation, Ch. 1, near
the end.
2. The English word competition leans decidedly to the latter meaning;
the French word concurrence, which the author uses, means both
competition and concurrent action.—Tr.
3. In times of famine, to-day, there is not a sack of flour in the remotest
village of the Crimea or America that does not find as competitors
for its possession, not merely a few persons in the neighborhood, as
formerly, but the merchants of all the European nations. Similarly, in
ordinary times, there is not a masterpiece of art, nor an old book in
the most obscure of French castles, that does not have to fear a con-
test for its purchase, not merely among a few amateurs of the neigh-
borhood or province or of all France, but even among the billionnaires
of America.68/Gabriel Tarde
4. A monopoly is always partial and relative. Undoubtedly M. Paul
Leroy-Beaulieu is right in saying that competition never results in an
absolute and complete monopoly; and the instance he cites of the
great stores, the Bon Marché, for example, which, after overcoming
the competition of so many little stores, has experienced new compe-
tition from the Louvre, the Printemps, the Samaritaine, etc., seems at
first sight convincing. But in reality, within a certain radius and to a
certain extent, each of these colossi of commerce has succeeded in
monopolizing a field for which thousands of petty firms were con-
tending; each has its own particular following in the country—a fol-
lowing which, for some reason or other, whether caprice or fashion,
belongs exclusively to itself. This is, most frequently, merely for the
reason that it has the reputation of excelling its rivals in the quality of
some particular article. Really, this so-called competition between
great stores can easily be moderated and toned down by mutual un-
derstandings, which are far more easy to reach, on account of the
small number interested, than in the case of the more numerous smaller
firms whose place they take; and, furthermore, such competition tends
more and more to become a mere division of labor, or rather an ap-
portionment of partial monopolies which they have come to share or
are gradually beginning to share.
5. The reader may be reminded of Bagehot’s treatment of “The Age of
Discussion” in his Physics and Politics.—Ed.Chapter III
The Adaptation of Phenomena
The explanations given in the two preceding chapters have al-
ready prepared us to understand the real meaning of the word
adaptation, which expresses the profoundest aspect under which
science views the universe. Here, again, we shall see that the evo-
lution of science, in any field of truth whatsoever, consists in a
passage from the great to the small, from the vague to the exact,
and from the false or superficial to the true and deep-rooted; that
is, it consists in first discovering or imagining a vast harmony of
the whole, or a few grand but vague external harmonies, and in
replacing these gradually by countless internal harmonies, form-
ing an infinite number of fruitful, infinitesimal adaptations. We
shall  observe, also, that the evolution of reality, which is, here as
elsewhere, exactly the reverse of that of thought about it, consists
in a ceaseless tendency on the part of minute internal harmonies
to externalize and enlarge themselves more and more. Inciden-
tally, we cannot help noticing, as has been already noted, that,
while the progress of knowledge enables us to discover new and
deeper harmonies, it also reveals many deeper and hitherto unob-
served incongruities.
But we must begin first with a few definitions or necessary
explanations. What is, precisely, an adaptation, or natural har-
mony? Let us take an example outside of life, where the teleologi-
cal connection between the organ and its function is so obvious as70/Gabriel Tarde
not to require explanation. Suppose we choose the basin of a river.
Here we find a mountain or a chain of hills adapted to the downflow
of the river’s waters, and the sunbeams adapted to the uplifting of
the ocean’s waters to the clouds; further, the winds are adapted to
transporting these clouds to the mountain summits, where they
fall again in showers and supply the springs, brooks, and rivers
which are tributary to the one great water-course. Thus we find
here an unstable equilibrium, a circuit of acts that are interlaced
and repeat themselves with variations. A living being, we may,
forms a similar circuit, only a much say more complex one; and,
moreover, the adaptation in him is not one-sided, as in the in-
stance cited, but reciprocal. The organ serves to fulfil a vital func-
tion, and reciprocally the vital function serves to maintain the or-
gan; whereas, in the case of the streams upon our planet, the moun-
tain is adapted to the flow of the waters; but the flow of waters,
far from effecting the preservation of the mountain, has the effect
of denuding it, and gradually carrying it away. And so, too, there
is no reciprocity in the adaptation of the sun’s heat to the irriga-
tion of the soil.
It is always, remember, a harmony that is repeated; we have
observed it already, let us point out other instances. Every planet
of the solar system, considered mechanically, that is, considered
as a moving point, reveals a harmony between its inclination to
fall into the sun and its tendency to fly away at a tangent; this
would constitute an opposition, if these two forces, the centrip-
etal and centrifugal, tended to exert themselves along the same
straight line; but since they act at right angles to each other, adap-
tation ensues. (In this way opposition and adaptation are trans-
formed, one into the other, in nature.)1 Now the planet’s orbit is a
repetition, the varied repetition, of this mechanical adaptation.
Again, considered geologically, from the standpoint of its strati-
graphic and physico-chemical composition, a planet is a most
harmonious adjustment of superimposed strata; and, if we may
believe M. Stanislas Meunier on this point, the same adjustment
occurs in every planet and in the general constitution of the solar
system itself. An imaginary cross-section of the earth, from cen-Social Laws/71
tre to circumference, would give a succession of incandescent
layers, followed by solid layers, then liquid, then gaseous, each
essential to the succeeding one; and this order of succession cor-
responds to the natures of the planets that we find if we start from
the sun as centre and go toward the limits of the system, to Nep-
tune, which is gaseous. However, the truth of this analogy is of
little importance.
Any aggregation whatsoever is a collection of individuals
jointly adapted, either some adapted to the remainder or all to a
common function. An aggregate means an adaptate. Moreover,
different aggregates which have relations with one another may
be coadapted; this constitutes an adaptate of a higher degree, and
an infinite number of such degrees may be distinguished. For the
sake of simplicity, let us distinguish merely between two degrees
of adaptation: adaptation of the first degree is that which the ele-
ments of the system in question have among themselves; adapta-
tion of the second degree is that which unites these elements to
the systems that surround them, that is, to what is vaguely de-
noted by the term environment. The adjustment with one’s self
differs greatly, in phenomena of every sort, from the adjustment
with others, just as self-repetition (habit) differs from the repeti-
tion of others (heredity or imitation), and as self-opposition (hesi-
tation and doubt) differs from opposition to others (strife or com-
petition.) Often these two kinds of opposition are to a certain
extent mutually exclusive. Thus in the matter of political organi-
zations, it has frequently been observed that the most self-consis-
tent—those that are the most logically deduced and that present
in the highest degree the characteristics of adaptation—are least
adapted to meet the requirements of their inherited and natural
environment; and, conversely, that the most practical are the least
logical. The same remark applies to grammars, religions, the fine
arts, etc.; thus the one perfect grammar, the only one whose rules
are quite without exception, is the grammar of—Volapäk! It ap-
plies to organisms as well; there are some that are so perfect as to
be almost incapable of living, and that would be better fitted for
life if they were less perfect; for perfectness of accommodation72/Gabriel Tarde
may detract from suppleness.2 These preliminaries settled, let us
point out the truth of the two propositions which were stated
above. The partisans of final causes have done their best to dis-
credit the notion of finality. It is nevertheless true that the first
babblings of science date from the moment when this notion was
introduced, even in its mystical and least rational form, into our
representation of the world. What did primitive consciousness
imagine, as it looked upon the universe of stars? It imagined a
single, vast, fanciful adaptation, born of the so-called geocentric
illusion; all the stars (it thought) existed for the sake of the earth;
the earth, and within the earth a single city or castle, were consid-
ered to be the focal point of the whole firmament, and the latter
was supposed to be busying itself solely and unceasingly with
ephemeral creatures like ourselves. Astrology was the logical
outcome of this magnificent but imaginary adaptation of the sky
to the earth and man. The true astronomy not only abolished this
absurd harmony, but shattered the unity of the celestial harmony
as well, breaking it up into as many partial harmonies as there are
solar systems; the latter prove to be coherent and symmetrically
coordinated as individuals, but bound together by exceedingly
vague and doubtful bonds, being grouped in shapeless nebulae
and scattered constellations, presenting a sparkling disorder.
Though the human reason takes greater delight in order than in
anything else, it must nevertheless abandon its attempt to dis-
cover the clearest marks of divine coordination in that all-em-
bracing world-group, the Cosmos, the object of man’s deepest
admiration. To find such marks, we must descend to the solar
system, and there, as we come to know this little universe better,
it is the details, rather than the general effect of this exquisite
grouping of masses, that arouses our delight. The relations of the
planets to one another do not strike us with as much astonishment
as the relation of each planet to its satellites, and still more the
geological formations on the surface of each sphere, the arrange-
ment of its water-courses, and its chemical composition, all of
which reveal so exact an agreement. Henceforth, the religious
mind need turn no longer far away to the vast vault of heaven,Social Laws/73
there to find and worship the fathomless wisdom that moves the
universe; rather, it must gaze into the chemist’s crucible, and there
discern the mystery of those physical harmonies that are surely
the most exact and marvellous of all—far more wonderful even
than the scattered disorder of the stars: I mean the chemical com-
binations. If, by means of some powerful microscope, we could
perceive the interior of a molecule, how much more fascinating
after all would appear the great network of elliptical and circular
motions that in all probability make it up, than the extremely simple
play of the great celestial tops!
If we pass from the physical world to the world of life, there,
too, we find that the first step of reason was to formulate the
notion of a single grand adaptation—the adaptation of the whole
organic creation, both vegetable and animal, to the ends of hu-
manity, for its nourishment, amusement, or protection, or to warn
it of secret dangers. Augury and totemism, which are found among
all peoples in the beginning, originate in this. However much the
growth of knowledge has dissipated this anthropocentric illusion,
something of it still remained in that erroneous view, so long ac-
cepted by natural philosophers, which consisted in representing
the palaeontological series as a straight ascent toward man, and in
regarding every species, whether extinct or living, as one chord in
a grand concert called the Divine Plan of Nature—an ideal and
regular structure, with man at the top. Painfully, and by dint of
denials accumulated by observation, mankind was led to give up
this cherished idea; then it was recognized that Nature does not
exert her wonderful harmonizing power to the greatest degree
along the broad lines of the evolution of beings,—a ramified and
tortuous path,—nor yet in the grouping of these different species
into zonal flora and fauna (though remarkable adaptation is ex-
hibited in commensalism, or the relations of insects with the flow-
ers of certain plants); but that it is exerted, rather, in the details of
each organism. The partisans of final causes have, I believe, di-
minished the value of the notion by making an erroneous and im-
proper use of it, though not an excessive one, for, on the contrary,
I should reproach them with having made much too restricted a74/Gabriel Tarde
use of it, through their unifying turn of mind. There is no single
end in nature—no end in relation to which all others are means;
but there is an infinite number of ends which are seeking to utilize
one another. Every organism, and in every organism every cell,
and in every cell, perhaps, every cellular element, has its own
particular Providence, for itself and in itself. Here, then, as be-
fore, we are led to consider the harmonizing force (certainly that
which positive science has a right to consider, without, however,
denying the possibility of some other), not as something unique,
external, and superior, but as indefinitely repeated, infinitesimal,
and internal. In reality, the source of all these harmonies of life,
which become less striking the farther we get from the starting-
point and the wider the field we embrace, is the fertilized germ;
this last is a living representation of the intersecting lines that meet
in it, forming often a felicitous cross-breed; it is the germ of new
talents, which are destined to spread broadcast and propagate
themselves in turn, thanks to the survival of the fittest, or the
elimination of the least fit.
Let us pass, now, to the social world. The theologians, who
have ever been the most prominent sociologists, though without
knowing that they were sociologists, frequently picture the stream
of the history of all peoples of the earth as converging, from the
beginnings of humanity, toward the advent of their own cult. On
this point see Bossuet. In vain has sociology endeavored to secu-
larize itself; it has never wholly freed itself from this sort of pre-
supposition. Comte brought over in a masterly way the thoughts
of Bossuet, whom he admired, with reason; with him, the entire
history of mankind converged toward the era of his own Positiv-
ism, which thus became a species of secular neo-Catholicism. In
the eyes of Augustin Thierry, Guizot, and other philosophers of
history who flourished about 1830, the whole course of Euro-
pean history appeared to converge toward—the July Monarchy!
Certainly it is not sociology that Comte founded; however admi-
rably carried out, it is merely a philosophy of history that he offers
us under this title, and it is the last word of the philosophy of
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name, his conception unwinds human history before our eyes like
a twisted skein; or rather it is a confused mass of many-colored
skeins; it appears under the guise of a single development, the
sole production of a sort of unique trilogy or tragedy, constructed
according to the rules of its kind—where everything is bound to-
gether, where each of the three interlocked pieces is composed of
phases linked to one another, each link being adapted to and riv-
eted exclusively to the succeeding, and where the whole moves
irresistibly on toward the final climax.
Spencer has made a great step in the direction of a healthier
understanding of social adaptation; his formula of social evolu-
tion applies, not to a single drama, but to a considerable number
of different social dramas. The evolutionists of his school, in thus
formulating the laws of linguistic, religious, economic, political,
moral, and aesthetic development, understand, at least implicitly,
that these laws are capable of governing, not merely the single
succession of peoples whose privilege it is to be called historic,
but equally well all peoples that have existed or are to exist in
future. But still, in a multitude of forms, though on a smaller scale,
the same error always comes to light, namely, the error of believ-
ing that, in order to see a gradual dawn of regularity, order, and
logic in social phenomena, we must go outside of the details, which
are essentially irregular, and rise high enough to obtain a pan-
oramic view of the general effect; that the source and foundation
of every social coordination is some general fact from which it
descends gradually to particular facts, though always diminishing
in strength; in short, that man acts, but a law of evolution guides
him.
I hold the contrary, in a certain sense. Not that I deny the
existence of certain slopes common to the diverse and multiform
historical evolutions of races, which flow like rivers into the same
basin; and I am well aware that, while many of these brooks and
rivers are lost en route, others, flowing together, one after an-
other, through a thousand eddies, end by mingling in one general
current, which, in spite of its division into different branches, does
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mouths. But I see, too, that the real cause of this vast river, the
final outcome of these various streams, in other words, of this
final preponderance of a single line of social evolution (that of the
so-called historic races), is the series of scientific discoveries and
industrial inventions that have gone on ceaselessly accumulating
and making use of one another; these have become bound to-
gether in a system or bundle, whose real logical interrelation,
though not without intricacies of its own, seems vaguely repeated
in the interrelation of the races which have contributed to its for-
mation. If we follow up this great scientific and industrial stream,
we find its source in the mind of every genius, whether obscure or
celebrated, who has added some new truth, some new means of
activity, to the enduring legacy of humanity, and who has made
the relations among mankind more harmonious by this contribu-
tion, by promoting community of thought and collaboration of
effort. And so, in opposition to the Philosophers of whom I have
been speaking, I maintain that the details of human events alone
contain striking adaptations; that the basis of those harmonies
which are less noticeable in a vaster domain here comes plainly to
view, and that the more we rise from a small but closely united
social group, such as the family, the school, the workshop, the
rural church, the convent, or the regiment, to the city, the prov-
ince, or the nation, the less complete and striking does this soli-
darity become. So, too, there is generally more logic in a phrase
than in a discourse, and more in a single discourse than in a suc-
cession or group of discourses; there is more in one special rite
than in a whole religion, in one point of law than in a whole legal
code, in one particular scientific theory than in the whole body of
science; and there is more in a single piece of work executed by
one workman than in the sum total of his performances.
This is true, be it observed, unless some powerful personality
intervenes to govern and overrule the interrelation of events. The
latter, however, tends to occur more and more frequently, since
civilization is distinguished by the facilities it offers for the real-
ization of special schemes of social reorganization; and in this
case it does not always hold true that the harmony of an aggre-Social Laws/77
gate is in inverse ratio to its mass. Often, indeed, the greater mass
may be the more harmonious, and this occurs more and more
frequently. For instance, the French administrative system, orga-
nized by the despotic genius of Napoleon, is quite as well adapted
to its own general end as any of the least of its wheels is to its own
particular end. The Prussian system of state railways is as well
adapted to its higher strategic end as any of its stations can possi-
bly be to its own commercial or other ends. The systems of Kant,
Hegel, and Spencer are all as consistent in their general coordina-
tion as any of the little partial theories that serve as their material.
A well-codified scheme of legislation may exhibit as much order
in the arrangement of its sections and chapters as any of the par-
tial laws that it embodies presents in its various interrelations.
Finally, when a religion has been moulded into an aggressive the-
ology, the concatenation of its dogmas may be, or appear to be,
more logical than each of them taken separately. Yet, as is easy to
see, these facts, though apparently contrary to those formulated
above, really vie with them in demonstrating that the individual
mind is the source of all social harmony. For these excellent coor-
dinations must have been conceived long before they could be
executed; they existed in the form of an idea hidden in a few cere-
bral cells, long before they began to cover so wide a domain.
Shall we not say, then, that the fundamental social adaptation
is, in the last analysis, that of two men, one of whom answers, by
word or deed, the question of the other, whether silent, spoken,
or tacit? I call it a “question,” for the satisfaction of a need, like
the solution of a problem, is the answer to a question. Shall we
not say, then, that this fundamental harmony consists in the rela-
tion between two men, one of whom teaches, while the other
learns—one of whom commands, while the other obeys—one of
whom produces, while the other buys and consumes—one of
whom is actor, poet, or artist, while the other is spectator, reader,
or amateur, or, better, that it consists in the relation between two
who work together to produce the same result? Certainly, for this
relation, though it implies the relationship of two men, one of
whom is pattern, the other copy, is really quite distinct from it.78/Gabriel Tarde
In my judgment, however, we must carry the analysis still far-
ther, and, as I have already intimated, seek the fundamental social
adaptation in the brain and individual mind of the inventor. Inven-
tion, if we limit the term to that which is destined to be imitated
(for what remains locked up in the mind of its creator, has no
social value),—invention, I say, is a harmony among ideas, which
is the parent of all the harmonies among men. In order that any
exchange between producer and consumer may come about, and
still more, in order that any gift may be made to the consumer of
the thing produced (for exchange is mutual giving, and as such is
preceded by one-sided giving), the producer must first have expe-
rienced two notions simultaneously: that of a need on the part of
the consumer or donee, and that of a means fitted to satisfy it.
Without the internal adaptation of these two ideas, the external
adaptation, first called gift and then exchange, would be impos-
sible. Similarly, the division of labor among a number of men,
when they apportion among themselves the different parts of a
single operation, hitherto executed by one man, would not have
been possible if the latter had not first conceived of all these dif-
ferent works as parts of the same whole, or means toward the
same end. At the basis of every association among men, I repeat,
there is originally an association among the ideas of the same man.
Let it not be objected that this adaptation of some ideas to
others only deserves to be called social when it expresses itself in
an adaptation of some men to others; for it is often expressed
otherwise, and one might even say that the other manner of ex-
pression tends to prevail. After the labor of a single man has been
replaced in a certain case by a division of work among several, it
frequently happens that a new invention causes all parts of the
operation to be performed by a single machine. In this case, the
division of labor and the association of tasks among men plays
merely the role of a middle term between the association of ideas
in the mind of the first author of the production and the associa-
tion of devices in the machine. Here the happy thought is not
embodied in the group of workers, but materialized in the bits of
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with the improvements in the manufacture of machinery. Sup-
pose, to take an impossible case, that all human productions were
thus performed by machinery. There would be no more division
of labor, since there would be no labor, or almost none, left; and
we might even say that there was no real social harmony left; yet
there would be a still greater degree of social unity; and this unity,
which is far more desirable than that harmony, would be the result
of a countless number of infinitely small cerebral adaptations.
Where can we find any more powerful social factors than these
phenomena, however individualistic they be?
We have just observed that the development of sociology, here
as elsewhere, has brought it down from the dizzy heights of grand
but vague causes, to real and precise acts of infinitesimal size. We
have now to demonstrate, or rather point out (for there is no time
for detailed examination), that the evolution of social facts, re-
versing the order of social science, consists in their gradual pas-
sage from a host of very small harmonies to a lesser number of
greater ones, and then to a very small number of very great ones,
till, in some indefinite future, the culmination of social progress is
reached in a single, all-embracing civilization, which is also the
most harmonious possible. It should be understood that this law
of gradual enlargement is not here supposed to include the ten-
dency of an invention or group of inventions to diffuse themselves
by imitation; this would be a return to the law of imitation with
which we are already familiar. Nor, yet, is it concerned with the
constant growth which this imitative radiation fosters in the social
harmony which is called the division of labor, but which should
more properly be called the solidarity of all labor. Supposing a
certain industry to remain the same, with no further advances, the
social cooperation that results therefrom will grow according as
the needs of consumption to which it responds, on the one hand,
and the acts of production by which it responds to them, on the
other, are spread by imitation beyond the region, at first circum-
scribed, in which it originally appeared. However important may
be the phenomenon of the growth of markets, which is the usual
precursor of the federation of peoples, this is not here under dis-80/Gabriel Tarde
cussion; indeed, it is unusual for this extrinsic growth to occur
without some intrinsic industrial progress.
It is this intrinsic growth that we have to discuss, that is, the
tendency of a given invention or social adaptation to become larger
and more complex by adapting itself to some other invention or
adaptation, and thus create a new adaptation, which, through other
encounters and logical combinations of the same sort, leads to a
higher synthesis, and so on. These two growths of invention—its
growth in extension by imitative diffusion, and its growth in com-
prehension by a series of logical combinations—are certainly quite
distinct, but, far from being mutually exclusive, and despite the
opposition between the extension and comprehension of notions
in other respects, they present a united front and prove insepa-
rable. Any mental association of two inventions that gives rise to
a third,—as, for instance, the notion of the wheel and the notion
of the domestication of the horse, which, after spreading indepen-
dently of one another for centuries, perhaps, finally coalesced and
harmonized in the notion of the cart,—any such association re-
quired necessarily the function of imitation to bring the notions
together within the same mind, just as previously, for the appear-
ance of each, its elements had to be brought to the mind of its
author by the radiation of various examples. And, further, every
new synthesis of inventions requires, generally, an imitative radia-
tion of wider scope than the preceding. There is a constant inter-
weaving of these two growths: the unifying growth of imitation
and the systematizing growth of invention. The bond that binds
them together lacks universality, no doubt; for a long succession
of difficult theorems may unroll themselves in the brain of an
Archimedes or a Newton, without the aid of any elements con-
tributed by other scientists during the interval between each two
discoveries; yet it is so usual a bond that we always expect to find
the extent of the social field, the completeness of social communi-
cations, and the breadth and depth of nationalities, as well as states,
increasing pari passu with the wealth of languages, the architec-
tural beauty of theologies, the cohesion of the sciences, the com-
plexity and codification of laws, the spontaneous organization orSocial Laws/81
legal supervision of industries, the system of finance, the com-
plexity and coordination of government, and the refinements and
varieties of literature and the fine arts.
Here, again, we must be careful not to confuse the growth of
education (a mere phenomenon of imitation) with the progress of
science (a phenomenon of adaptation), as is so often done; nor
the growth of industrialism with the progress of industry itself;
nor the growth of morality with the progress of ethics; nor the
growth of militarism with the progress of the military art; nor yet
the growth of a language, meaning thereby its territorial expan-
sion, with the progress of that language, in the sense of increased
refinement of its grammar and enrichment of its vocabulary. If
science continues to progress while education ceases to spread
further, the result is not the same as if education spread while
science remained stationary, and we cannot combine the two cases
by vaguely naming each an increase, or growth of illumination.
On the contrary, they are two things that lack any common stan-
dard. Every gain of science, every truth added to her hoard, or
adaptate of propositions that harmonize with one another, is not a
mere summation, but rather a multiplication, and mutual confir-
mation; while every scholar added to the aggregate, every new
brain copy added to the edition of taught science, is merely one
unit more in the pile. To be exact, we must, of course, see in this
something more than mere addition; for the community of intel-
lect that results from the similarity of the education given to dif-
ferent children increases the confidence of each in his own knowl-
edge,3 and this also is a social adaptation, and not one of the least
precious.
But before going further, we must pause to make a number of
important observations. In the first place, let us note how much
clearer and more exact the notion of adaptation becomes when
we pass from the physical world, and even the world of life, to the
social world. For, do we know precisely what constitutes the ad-
aptation of an acid molecule to the basic molecule with which it
combines?—or the adaptation of a grain of pollen to the ovule
which, after being fertilized by it, gives birth to a new individual,82/Gabriel Tarde
the founder, perhaps, of a new race? We certainly do not know
anything definite about it. It is true that, when two sound-waves
interfere, and instead of destroying each other, are of mutual as-
sistance, so that they produce a reinforcement of the sound or
some unexpected timbre effect, we understand somewhat better
the nature of the phenomenon; but, as a matter of fact, this mere
reinforcement of the sound or production of a new timbre is an
original creation only from the standpoint of our subjective sensa-
tions of hearing, and has nothing in common with the objective
innovation resulting from chemical combination. Similarly, when
two animal or vegetable species come together in such a way that
each serves as the other’s aid or parasite, this clear case of mutual
assistance among living things gives rise simply to an increase of
their well-being and number, and must not be confounded with
the phenomenon of fertilization, which remains extremely obscure.
But, when a felicitous interference occurs between two imitative
radiations, whatever its nature, our reason can always grasp its
meaning. It may consist merely in a mutual stimulation, as when
the increased use of the Auer gas-jet favored an increased use of
gas, or when the wider diffusion of the French language favored a
wider diffusion of French literature, which in turn favored the
spread of the former. It may also happen that this interference
proves of great efficacy and gives rise to some new invention, a
centre from which new rays of imitation start; thus the use of
copper, encountering one day the use of tin, suggested the idea of
making bronze; and so, too, the knowledge of algebra and geom-
etry suggested to Descartes the algebraic expression of curves.
But in the latter case, as in the former, we see clearly that adapta-
tion is either a logical or a teleological relation, and that it can
always be referred to one or other of these two types; sometimes,
as in the case of Newton’s Law, or any scientific law whatsoever,
it is a synthesis of ideas which formerly seemed neither to confirm
nor to contradict one another, and which now prove to be mutu-
ally confirmatory, as consequences of the same principle; or, again,
as in the case of some industrial machine, it is a synthesis of acts
which were formerly strangers to one another, and now, beingSocial Laws/83
brought together in some ingenious way, serve as common means
to a single end. The invention of the cart (itself a complex affair,
as we know), the discovery of iron, the discovery of the motive
power of steam, the invention of the piston, and the invention of
the rail, all these inventions, which once seemed foreign to one
another, have been brought together in the invention of the lo-
comotive.
In the second place, whether we take a synthesis of acts, or
some invention, industrial or scientific, religious or aesthetic,—in
short, whether we are dealing with the theoretical or the practi-
cal, the fundamental process that enters into its make-up is al-
ways what may be called logical association by pairs; for, what-
ever be the number of notions or actions that a theory or a ma-
chine synthesizes, there are never more than two elements com-
bined at a time, and adapted to one another, in the mind of the
inventor, or any of the inventors that assisted, in turn, in its pro-
duction.4 In his recent work on Semantic, M. Bréal, speaking of
language, makes an acute observation, which lends support to
this general principle: “Whatever be the length of a compound
word,” he says, “it never includes more than two terms. This is no
arbitrary rule; it comes from the nature of our intellect, which
always associates its notions in pairs.” In another passage, refer-
ring to the schematic figures by means of which James Darmesteter
endeavors to make clear to the eye the development of the signifi-
cance of words through various channels, the same author says:
“We must remember that these complex figures have no value,
except for a single linguist; for, whoever invents a new meaning
for a word, forgets, for the time being, all its previous meanings
except one, so that associations of ideas always occur in pairs.”
And in this they correspond to oppositions of ideas, as we have
observed. It would be easy, though of course it would take too
long, to show how general this process really is, by examining in
turn the manner in which each discovery or improvement was
added to some previous discovery, whether in the scientific, legal,
economic, political, artistic, or moral spheres. Rather, let us indi-
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possible and necessary.
It is due chiefly to this. On the one hand, the course of the
mind’s activity, its fundamental procedure, consists in passing from
one idea to another, and uniting the two by means of a judgment
or volition—a judgment which exhibits the idea of the attribute as
implicated in that of the subject, or a volition which regards the
idea of the means as implicated in that of the end. On the other
hand, when the mind passes from some judgment to another which
is more complex, or from some volition to another which is more
comprehensive, it is because, by dint of mental repetition in that
dual form of self-imitation called memory or habit, a judgment is
compressed into a notion, so that its two terms, coalescing, are
welded together and become indistinguishable, and a volition or
aim is transformed into a reflex involving ever less of conscious-
ness. By this inevitable transformation, which operates socially
on a large scale, under the revered titles of tradition and custom,
our former judgments are fitted to enter, under the guise of no-
tions, into the substance of some new judgment, and our former
aims into the substance of some new aim. From the lowest to the
highest operation of our understanding and will, this process oc-
curs unaltered. No theoretical discovery is anything but the union,
in a judgment, of an attribute (that is, of earlier judgments) with
some new subject; and, similarly, no practical discovery is other
than the voluntary union of a means (that is, an end formerly de-
sired for its own sake) with a new end. Thus by an alternation, at
once most simple and most fruitful, of contrary transformations
which succeed one another ad infinitum, yesterday’s judgment or
end becomes simply to-day’s notion or means, and will pass over
into to-morrow’s judgment or end, which is destined, in turn, to
succumb to the same process of consolidation, and so on. Through
this rhythm, which is at once social and psychological, there have
gradually been raised the many grand structures of accumulated
discoveries and inventions that so excite our admiration: our lan-
guages, religions, sciences, codes, and administrative systems, as
well as our military organization, industries, and arts.
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as a grammar, a code, or a theology, the individual mind appears
so trivial a thing beside these monumental works that the idea of
regarding it as the sole artisan concerned in the erection of these
enormous cathedrals seems to some sociologists quite absurd; and
one may readily be excused if, without perceiving that he thereby
abandons all attempt at explanation, he is drawn into saying that
these works are eminently impersonal; yet there is but a step from
this position to that of my illustrious opponent, M. Durkheim,
who insists that they are not functions of the individual, but his
factors, and that they have an existence independent of human
personality, and rule man with despotic might, by the oppressive
shadow which they cast over him. But how have these social re-
alities come into being? (I say realities, for, although I oppose the
idea of a social organism, I am far from challenging the concept
of certain social realities, concerning which some understanding
must be reached.) I see clearly that, once formed, they impose
themselves upon the individual, sometimes, though rarely, with
constraint, oftener by persuasion or suggestion or the curious plea-
sure that we experience, from childhood up, in saturating our-
selves with the examples of our myriad surrounding models, as
the babe in imbibing its mother’s milk. This I see clearly enough;
but how were these wonderful monuments constructed, and by
whom, if not by men and through human efforts?
As regards the structure of science, probably the most impos-
ing of human edifices, there is no possible question. It was built in
the full light of history, and we can follow its development almost
from the very outset down to our own day. Our sciences began as
a scattered and disconnected collection of small discoveries, which
were afterward grouped into little theories (each group being it-
self a discovery); and the latter were welded, later, into broader
theories, to be confirmed or amended by a host of other discover-
ies, and finally bound firmly together by the arches of hypotheses
built over them by the spirit of unification: this manner of progress
is indisputable. There is no law nor scientific theory (any more
than there is a system of philosophy) that does not bear its author’s
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vidual; not only the materials, but the general design of the whole,
and the detail sketches as well; everything, including what is now
diffused among all cultured minds, and taught even in the primary
school, began as the secret of some single mind, whence a little
flame, faint and flickering, sent forth its rays, at first only within a
narrow compass, and even there encountering many obstructions,
but, growing brighter as it spread further, it at length became a
brilliant illumination.
Now, if it seems plainly evident that science was thus con-
structed, it is no less true that the construction of every dogma,
legal code, government, or economic régime was effected in the
same manner; and if any doubt be possible with respect to lan-
guage and ethics, because the obscurity of their origin and the
slowness of their transformations remove them from observation
through the greater part of their course, is it not highly probable
that their evolution followed the same path? For, it is by minute
accretions of image-laden expressions, picturesque phrases, and
new words, or words new in meaning, that our language enriches
itself to-day; and, though each of these innovations is usually un-
signed, it is none the less due to some personal initiative, imitated
by first one and then another; and these happy expressions which
swarm in every language are just what different languages, brought
into mutual relation, are continually borrowing from one another,
to enlarge their vocabulary, and render their grammar more flex-
ible, and at the same time more complicated. So, too, it is through
a series of petty, individual revolts against the accepted ethics, or
through petty, individual additions to its precepts, that this system
of ethics undergoes a gradual modification. Thus we have ad-
vanced by successive stages, from a remote era, when languages
were countless in number, but poverty-stricken, and each spoken
by a single populace, tribe, or town, and when ethical codes were
very numerous, dissimilar, and simple, to an epoch when a small
number of very wealthy languages, and very complex codes of
morality, contend for future supremacy on the earth.
One thing, however, must be granted to the opponents of the
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frequently made the mistake of speaking of great men when they
should have spoken of great ideas, which often appear in very
unimportant men, or of the trivial ideas and infinitesimal innova-
tions contributed by each of us to the common work. For, as a
matter of fact, all, or nearly all of us, have had a share in the
building of these enormous structures that overshadow and pro-
tect us; each one of us, however orthodox he be, has his own
religion, and each, however precise, his own language and ethics;
the most commonplace of scientists has his own science, and the
most bureaucratic of officials his own system of administration.
And just as each, consciously or unconsciously, adds his own little
invention to the enduring heritage of social material of which he is
the temporary repository, so, too, each has his own imitative ra-
diation in a sphere more or less contracted, which, nevertheless,
suffices to prolong his discovery beyond his own ephemeral exist-
ence and pass it on to future workmen who may make some defi-
nite use of it. Imitation, which socializes the individual, also per-
petuates good ideas from every source, and in the process of per-
petuating them brings them together and makes them fertile.
It may possibly be urged, then, that, given the eternal nature
of things, in conjunction with the human mind, itself an enduring
object, human science was bound inevitably to reach, sooner or
later, by it matters not what path of individual discovery, the stage
in which we now see it, and the stage in which our grandchildren
will see it; that its future form, bright and glorious, was already
predetermined from the earliest perceptions of the savage; and,
hence, that the role of the individual and the brilliant accident of
genius are of slight importance, or lose their importance every
day, as we approach that ideal reality, of Platonic attractiveness,
whose outline we are now beginning to discern. But such an ob-
jection, if true, must be generalized, and it would then follow that
some irresistible attraction, divinely planned and invisible, must
be driving all humanity onward, by a certain chain of satisfactions
and needs, born successively of one another, to the same final
political goal, whether economic or otherwise, and to the same
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erto this view has proved most contrary to fact; for, the more the
different civilizations—Christian, Buddhistic, or Mohammedan—
which divide the earth between them have developed, the more
marked have become their distinctions and dissimilarities. What
pleases me especially in this theory is its idealism; but it is not
sufficiently idealistic, and hence misrepresents that view. For it is
not a single idea, nor a small number of ideas, hovering in mid-air,
that move the world; rather, there are thousands upon thousands
striving for the distinction of having led it. The ideas that stir up
the world are the ideas of the actors upon its stage, each one of
whom has fought to effect the triumph of his own ideas in some
dream of local, national, or international reconstruction, which
developed as it realized itself, and sometimes grew bolder even
after it was vanquished. Each character in history is the model of
a new humanity, and his entire personality and individual efforts
are but the expression of that incipient universal which he bears
within himself. And of these countless ideas, these great patriotic
or humanitarian projects, that wave above the struggling mass of
humanity like great banners mutually rent asunder, one alone,
possibly, out of myriads, is destined to survive; but even this must
have been personal in origin, bursting forth, some time, from the
head or heart of some man. I am willing to grant that this triumph
was necessary; but its necessity, which appeared afterward, and
which no one saw in advance, or could have foreseen with cer-
tainty, is merely a verbal expression for the superiority of the indi-
vidual efforts enlisted in support of this particular conception. Final
cause and efficient causes are mingled here, and there is no good
reason for distinguishing them.
It is because the material and plans of every social construc-
tion are all individual contributions, that I am unwilling to admit
the despotic and resistless nature of the constraint placed upon
the individual, which has been considered the essential and dis-
tinctive characteristic of social phenomena. Were this the case,
the sphere of truth could never grow, and these structures could
never have been built; for, in each of the successive steps of growth
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proposed law, scientific theory, industrial process, etc.), the new-
comer obtains admittance, not by force, but by gentle persuasion
and suggestion. Observe the manner in which the palatial edifice
of science has grown. Some theory is long discussed in the sphere
of higher learning, before it spreads in the form of a more or less
probable hypothesis, and at length descends into the sphere of
secondary education, where it is more rigorously accepted; but,
generally, it is only after such a theory reaches the sphere of pri-
mary education that it becomes quite dogmatic, and exerts, or
endeavors to exert, the far from despotic coercion already re-
ferred to on the minds of its youthful adherents, who lend them-
selves to this coercion with the greatest willingness. This means,
in other words, that its present imperative character has arisen by
virtue of its former persuasiveness, and the whole through imita-
tive diffusion. The same holds true of any industrial innovation
that spreads; it is the caprice of a chosen few before it becomes a
public need and forms part of the necessities of life. For the luxu-
ries of to-day are the necessities of tomorrow, in the same way
that the higher education of to-day becomes the secondary or pri-
mary instruction of to-morrow.
This great problem of social adaptation ought really to be
traced out along numerous other lines; some of these I have
sketched in my work on Social Logic, to which I may refer here.
But we must set a limit somewhere. I need scarcely insist upon
the fact, unfortunately only too plain, that, as these adaptations
multiply and become more definite, at the same time certain dis-
tressing and perplexing social inadaptations come to light, which
justify so many of man’s complaints. However, we are now in a
better position to explain why the natural harmonies, as well as
the natural symmetries, are rarely perfect, and why we find ac-
companying them and mixed up with them certain disharmonies
and dissymmetries which sometimes contribute to the production
of higher adaptations and oppositions. It is because perfect adap-
tation and perfect opposition are but the two limits of an infinite
series, between which are countless intermediary positions. Be-
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and an absolute contradiction between the two, there are an infi-
nite number of partial contradictions and partial confirmations,
without counting the infinite number of degrees of affirmative and
negative belief. Invention is a question followed by an answer.
But for each question set a thousand answers are possible, of all
possible degrees of completeness and exactness. To the question
concerning the need of sight, not merely has the human eye re-
sponded, but throughout nature there are all the various eyes of
insects, birds, and molluscs. And, similarly, to the question con-
cerning the need of recording speech, the Phoenician alphabet
was not the only one to respond.
At the basis of every society we find a host of answers, both
great and small, to the various questions proposed, and a host of
new questions arising out of these very answers; and it is for this
reason that we find also a large number of struggles, great or
small, between the advocates of various solutions. Strife is merely
a coming together of harmonies; but this kind of encounter is not
the only relation that exists between harmonies; their most com-
mon relation is agreement—the production of a superior harmony.
Every moment, whether we are speaking or working at any task
whatsoever, we both feel a need and satisfy it; and it is these series
of satisfactions or solutions, that make up conversation and labor,
as well as domestic and international politics, diplomacy, and
war,—in short, all forms of human activity. The constantly re-
newed efforts of the individuals in a nation to adapt their lan-
guage to their passing thoughts5 are what cause the gradual modi-
fication and transformation of speech, and the birth of new lan-
guages. If a record could have been kept, as Abbé Rousselot en-
deavored to do in a small section of Charente, of all these succes-
sive efforts, we would be able to note the exact number of funda-
mental linguistic adaptations that have been integrated into a
modification of the sound or sense of words. Similarly, all men,
but especially those who feel that they are most ill-adapted to
their environment and to themselves, are constantly endeavoring
to adapt their dogmas and religious precepts to their needs and
knowledge, and to adapt their customs and laws and even theirSocial Laws/91
moral code to the same; and these constant efforts result in a
gradual accumulation of slight improvements.6 Then, too, from
time to time, some great inventor or some great harmonizer arises.
Disharmonies are to harmonies what dissymmetries are to sym-
metries and variations to repetitions. It is from the midst of exact
repetitions, absolute contrasts, and perfect harmonies, that the
best examples of general diversity, picturesqueness, and disorder
appear, namely, the individual characteristics of things. The ex-
pression of a man or woman’s face, refined by the influences of
the social life and the intense, complex, and ceaseless life of imita-
tion, is a small and fleeting phenomenon. Yet there is nothing so
important as just this fugitive shade of expression. And no painter
has succeeded in catching it; no poet or novelist has recalled it to
life, no matter how hard he has striven in the attempt. The thinker
has no right to smile at sight of their long-continued endeavors to
grasp this almost tangible thing, which never has been, and never
can be, recalled. There is no science of the individual, but art is
wholly of the individual. And the scientist, remembering that the
life of the universe depends entirely on the fruition of personal
individuality, would be compelled to reflect on the artist’s labor
with a humility mingled with some envy, did he not himself, by
stamping his personal seal on his own general notion of phenom-
ena, always impart to that notion an aesthetic value, the real raison
d’être of his thought.
Notes:
1. A waterspout or cyclone is likewise an atmospheric harmony, a cir-
cuit of acts due to the interworking of two forces which do not im-
pede, but reinforce each other in their resultant.
2. A mental intuition or idea being given, the intellectual progress start-
ing from this idea (which is usually a mixture of truth and error) may
proceed in two different directions: first, in the direction of an adap-
tation of the first degree merely, that is, a gradual harmonizing of that
idea with itself, along the line of differentiation and self-consistency.
This is the course taken by many systems of philosophy and of meta-
physics. Second, in the direction of an adaptation of the second de-
gree, that is, a gradual harmonizing of that idea with the material92/Gabriel Tarde
received through the senses, and with the external data supplied by
perception and discovery generally. This is the course taken by sci-
ence. In the first case the advance often consists in passing from a
lesser to a greater error.
3. It should be noted in passing that this similarity of education is com-
plete only in the primary schools, that it is less so in the secondary
schools, in spite of the uniformity of requirements for the bachelor’s
degree, and that it is still less so in the higher schools or colleges,
where a wide disagreement of teaching frequently appears. And the
subordinate and mediate character of Contradiction and Discussion
is revealed also in the fact that the higher education, where they flour-
ish, always tends to degenerate into secondary education, where they
are far less marked, and then into primary teaching, where they dis-
appear entirely. The contradictions among scientists serve no pur-
pose except to bring out certain adaptations of truths, for the future
use of the rural schoolmaster.
4. See, in my Laws of Imitation, the chapter on the Logical Laws of
Imitation, especially p. 175 and p. 195 f. (French edition); and in my
Social Logic, the chapter on the Laws of Invention.
5. On this subject see M. Bréal’s Semantic.
6. If we wish to make sociology a truly experimental science and stamp
it with the seal of absolute exactness, we must, I believe, generalize
the method of Abbé Rousselot in its essential features, through the
collaboration of a great number of trustworthy observers. Let twenty,
thirty, or as many as fifty sociologists, from different sections of France
or any other country, write out with the greatest care and in the great-
est possible detail the succession of minute transformations in the
political or industrial world, or some other sphere of life, which it is
their privilege to observe in their native town or village, beginning
with their own immediate surroundings. Instead of limiting them-
selves to vague generalities, let them note in full the specific instances
of the rise or fall of religious or political faith, of morality or immo-
rality, of luxury, comfort, and whatever modifications of political or
religious belief have occurred under their eyes since they reached the
age of reason, beginning with their own family and circle of friends.
Let them strive to the utmost, like the noted linguist already men-
tioned, to trace out the individual sources of the slight diminutions,
augmentations, or transformations of ideas and tendencies which have
spread through a certain group of men, and which are expressed bySocial Laws/93
imperceptible changes in language, gesture, toilet, and other customs.
Let this be done, and within such a highly instructive body of mono-
graphs there cannot fail to appear certain most important truths—
truths most valuable for the sociologist and statesman to know. These
narrative monographs would differ radically from our present de-
scriptive monographs, and would be far more enlightening. To un-
derstand social conditions, we must seize social changes in detail as
they pass; while the converse is not true. For, however much we ac-
cumulate instances of the concurrence of social conditions in every
country of the world, the law of their formation does not appear, or
rather, it is covered up by the mass of collected evidence. But any one
who knew thoroughly, in exact detail, the changes of custom on some
particular points, in a single country and during ten years, could not
fail to lay his hand upon a general principle of social transformation,
and consequently upon a principle of social formation, that would
apply to every land and to all time. In such a research it would be
well to take up a very limited number of questions: for instance, it
might first be asked, by whom and how the custom was originally
introduced and generalized, among the peasants of certain rural dis-
tricts in southern France, of not saluting the well-to-do proprietors of
their neighborhood; or through what influences the belief in sorcery,
the were-wolf, and the like, begin to disappear.Conclusion
It is now time to conclude; but, in concluding, let us sum up the
principal positions to which we have been led, and seek to under-
stand the meaning of their conjunction. We observed that all sci-
ence subsisted on similarities, contrasts (or symmetries), and har-
monies, that is, on repetitions, oppositions, and adaptations; and
we asked what was the law of each of these three terms, as well as
their relation with one another. We have seen that, in spite of its
natural and a priori apparently legitimate tendency to choose the
greatest, most widespread, and most imposing phenomena to ex-
plain the less marked, the human mind has been irresistibly led to
discover the underlying principle of every order of things in the
most hidden facts, whose depths, it is true, remain unsounded.
This discovery ought to cause great surprise; yet it does nothing
of the sort, for the habit of scientific observation has made us
thoroughly familiar with such reversals of the order imagined by
our earlier thought. Thus the law of repetition, whether we mean
by this the undulatory and rotatory repetition of the physical world,
the hereditary and habit-like repetition of the world of life, or the
imitative repetition of the social world, implies a tendency to move
along a path of steady growth, from a comparatively infinitesimal
to a comparatively infinite scale. The law of opposition is in no
way different; it consists in a tendency to enlarge in an ever wid-
ening sphere, beginning with a certain point in the world of life;
this point is the brain of some individual, and more specifically a
cell in this brain, where a contradiction between two beliefs orSocial Laws/95
two desires is produced by an interference between imitative rays
from without. Such is the fundamental social opposition, which is
the moving principle of the bloodiest wars, in the same way that
the fundamental social repetition is the specific fact of the exist-
ence of some first imitator, who forms the starting-point of a great
epidemic of custom. Finally, the law of adaptation is similar; the
fundamental social adaptation is some individual invention that is
destined to be imitated, that is, the felicitous interference of two
imitations, occurring first in one single mind; and this harmony,
though quite internal in origin, tends not only to externalize itself
as it spreads, but also to unite with some other invention, in a
logical couple, thanks to this imitative diffusion, and so on, until,
by successive complications and harmonizations of the harmo-
nies, the grand collective works of the hum an mind are con-
structed,—a grammar, a theology, an encyclopaedia, a code of
laws, a natural or artificial organization of labor, a scheme of aes-
thetics or a system of ethics.
Thus, in a word, everything undoubtedly starts with the infi-
nitely minute; and we may add that it probably returns thither; this
is its alpha and omega. Everything that constitutes the visible uni-
verse, the universe accessible to observation, proceeds, as we
know, out of the invisible and inscrutable,—out of a seeming noth-
ingness,—whence all reality emerges in an inexhaustible stream.
If we reflect on this curious phenomenon, we shall be astonished
at the strength of the prejudice, both popular and scientific, which
makes every one, whether he be a Spencer or the first man we
chance to meet, regard the infinitesimal as insignificant, that is, as
homogeneous, neutral, and possessed of neither soul nor indi-
viduality. How persistent an illusion this is! And it is all the more
inexplicable because, like everything else, we, too, are destined
soon to return, through death, to this despised infinitesimal from
whence we are sprung—which may be (who knows?) the real
beyond, that haven in the hereafter, so vainly sought for amid the
infinities of space. However this may be, what reason have we for
concluding a priori, without a knowledge of the world of ele-
ments, that the visible world, the great world about us, is the sole96/Gabriel Tarde
scene of thought and seat of the various phenomena of life? How
can we imagine such a thing, when every moment we see some
personal being, with peculiar and radiating characteristics, spring-
ing forth from the inmost recesses of a fertilized egg and from the
inmost recesses of a certain part of that egg—a part that grows
constantly smaller, almost to the vanishing point, in proportion as
we get a better view of it? Can we imagine this limiting point, the
source of such important differences, to be itself undifferentiated?
I am aware of the objection that will be raised in the supposed law
of the instability of the homogeneous. But this law is false and
arbitrary; it was conceived merely for the sake of reconciling the
notion that what is indistinguishable to our eyes is really undiffer-
entiated, with the evidences of diversity among phenomena and
the exuberant variations that appear in the organic, psychologi-
cal, and social spheres. The truth is that only the heterogeneous is
unstable, while the homogeneous is essentially stable. The stabil-
ity of phenomena varies directly with their homogeneity. The only
perfectly homogeneous thing (or apparently so) in nature is the
space of geometry, which has not altered since Euclid. Will it be
maintained that some very minute germ of heterogeneity, intro-
duced into a relatively homogeneous aggregate, like yeast in a
cake, is bound to bring about a growing differentiation? This I
dispute; for in  an orthodox land, where religious or political opin-
ions all agree, a heresy or dissenting view that is introduced has
far more chance of being absorbed or expelled in short order than
of growing at the expense of the dominant church or political
party. I do not deny the law of differentiation in its organic or
social bearings; but it is sadly misunderstood if it prevents us from
seeing the law of increasing unification that mingles with it and
cooperates with it. In reality, the differentiation in question is the
very adaptation that we have been discussing: thus, for instance,
the division of labor in our social organizations is merely a gradual
association or co-adaptation of different labors by means of suc-
cessive inventions. Confined to the household first of all, it pro-
ceeded to repeat and enlarge itself unceasingly. It extended itself
first to the city, where various households, formerly similar to oneSocial Laws/97
another, though each differentiated within itself, became more
unlike one another, though each more homogeneous in itself. Later
on, it became national, and at length international.
It is not true, then, that differences increase in number; for, if
new differences appear every instant, old differences vanish at the
same time; and taking this into consideration, we have no reason
for supposing that the sum total of differences (if, indeed, it be
possible to add together things which have no element in com-
mon) has really increased in the universe. But something far more
important than a mere increase of difference is constantly taking
place, namely, the differentiation of the differences themselves.
The process of change is itself undergoing a change, in a direction
that is taking us from an era of the crudest juxtaposition of differ-
ences, such as startling and unblended colors, to an era of harmo-
niously shaded differences. Whatever may be thought of this par-
ticular view, it is nevertheless inconceivable, upon the hypothesis
of a homogeneous substance subject from eternity to the levelling
and coordinating influences of scientific laws, how a universe such
as ours, luxuriating in surprises and caprice, could ever have come
into existence. What can spring from a perfectly similar and per-
fectly coordinated system, except a world eternally and superla-
tively uniform? And so, in place of the usual conception of the
universe as being formed (like an enormous sand-heap) of ele-
ments quite similar at bottom, whence diversity sprang in some
unaccountable manner, I propose this conception of my own, which
represents it as the realization of a host of elementary potentiali-
ties,1 each possessing individuality and ambition, and containing
in itself its own distinctive universe, the object of its dreams. For
an infinitely greater number of fundamental projects miscarry than
ever reach full development; and the great struggle for existence,
through which the least adapted beings are eliminated, is waged
between competing dreams and rival projects, rather than differ-
ent beings. Thus the mysterious basement of the phenomenal world
may be quite as rich in differences, though differences of another
sort, as the upper stories of visible, superficial realities.
Yet, after all, the metaphysical theory that I have just indi-98/Gabriel Tarde
cated is of slight importance in comparison with the exposé that
precedes it, and I merely put forward this hypothesis in parenthe-
sis, with the remark that, even if it be rejected, the more solid and
more positive arguments presented above still remain standing. It
merely permits us to gather within a single heading the two ap-
parently different kinds of fact that we have met with in the course
of our journey: namely, the facts pertaining to the regular succes-
sion of repetitions, struggles, and harmonies in the universe,—in
other words, the regular side of the universe, which is the subject-
matter of science, and those relating to the more uncouth aspect
of the universe, which art delights continually to seize and repro-
duce, and which satisfy (as it would seem) an eternal craving for
diversity, picturesqueness, and disorder, through the operation of
this same universal assimilation, symmetrization, and harmoniza-
tion. It is the easiest thing in the world to understand this appar-
ent anomaly, if we grant that the sub-phenomenal differences of
things are forever striving, not to efface themselves, but to blos-
som out and appear at the surface. Then, everything is explained.
The mutual relations of our three terms—repetition, opposition,
and adaptation—are easily understood, when we consider suc-
cessive repetitions as operating sometimes in favor of adaptation,
which they spread and develop by their own interferences, some-
times in favor of opposition, which they arouse by interferences
of another sort. And, similarly, we may believe that all three of
these factors work together to effect the expansion of universal
variation in its highest, widest, and profoundest individual and
personal forms.
Notes:
1. On this subject see the study entitled Monadology and Sociology, in
my Essais et Mélanges (Paris and Lyons, Storck & Masson, 1895).